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[T]he student of the “legal” must wrestle with how the “legal” 
comes into recognizable being as a something discernibly 
different from just what is going on, in general. 
-Karl Llewellyn1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Law’s interdisciplinary turn toward social sciences suggests a growing 
realization that jurists may not be independently equipped to explain the 
world in and upon which they act.  But if law embraces empirical social 
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 1. Karl Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal and the Law Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method, 49 
YALE L. J. 1355, 1366 (1940). 
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science for its usable output, it struggles to make sense of the more 
interpretive disciplines such as anthropology.  This has proven to be a major 
setback for both law and anthropology and confounds the historically 
productive rapport between the two fields stretching back more than a 
century.2  While it may be tempting to conclude that today’s legal academic 
misunderstands the interpretive turn in anthropology, that conclusion offers 
little to facilitate a rapport of the kind badly needed today.  
Instead, in this piece I wish to argue that legal scholars’ difficulty with 
anthropology arises not from its interpretivism generally, but from its 
particular approach that equates law with culture for what appears to be 
methodological expediency.  As I explain below, the equation that treats law 
as culture permits the anthropologist to study law at a wide variety of 
“locations” or “field sites”3 while sacrificing a distinction that is—even if 
socially fabricated—of great significance to the people for and against whom 
it operates.  What this comes down to, then, is a confrontation between two 
views:  one that sees law as merely a variant of larger systems of symbol and 
practice and a second that sees it as somehow exceptional—autonomous in 
its operation and consequence in daily life. While this may share with other 
accounts the conclusion of autonomy, it uses it differently.4  As some defend 
or eulogize a putatively natural autonomy of law, I join positivists in viewing 
legal autonomy as social fact—fabricated and maintained through 
relationships between institutions and actors.5  My suggestion here, is that we 
view law from the inside as autonomous because that is how most experience 
                                                           
 2. See Sally Falk Moore, Certainties Undone: Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology, 1949–
1999, in LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY:  A READER 346–67 (Sally Falk Moore ed., 2005).    
 3. See, e.g., Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson, Discipline and Practice: “The Field” as Site, Method, 
and Location in Anthropology, in ANTHROPOLOGICAL LOCATIONS: BOUNDARIES AND GROUNDS OF A 
FIELD SCIENCE 2 (Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson eds., 1997). 
 4. Brian H. Bix, Law as an Autonomous Discipline, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 
976 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet ed., 2003):  
It remains valuable to focus on what is distinctive to law—that it is, in most legal systems, 
guidance through general rules; that it may involve an interaction of law-making and law-
applying institutions (e.g., courts applying the rules passed by legislatures); and that (in 
common law systems) the application of rules will be done through a judicial system that 
both authorizes judicial law-making and has important rules of stare decisis (rules of 
hierarchy and rules about the way that later decisions are constrained by earlier decisions).  
All of these features may contribute to a form of reasoning that is distinctive, if not entirely 
autonomous. 
Id.; see also Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: the Semi-autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973); Richard Posner, The Decline of Law as 
an Autonomous Discipline, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987). 
 5. Bix, supra note 4, at 977 (“As regards legal reasoning, ‘autonomy’ should be understood in a 
relative way. No one has ever seriously claimed that law is a way of thinking entirely of its own category, 
and legal reasoning, even when most autonomous, does not shun (for example) basic rules of logic and 
inference. While there are times when the legal profession seems to depend on a language and a way of 
thinking entirely foreign to common sense and common language, this is the only appearance of the 
extremes of the practice.”). 
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and navigate it under regimes of increasing global complexity and 
expansiveness.6    
This suggestion departs from current legal anthropology in an important 
manner.  To date, most work within the subfield has explored the meaning of 
law to its ambient culture and society; it has focused upon the ways in which 
law mediates social relations and becomes meaningful in everyday life.  
Here, I wish to take the opposite approach of understanding culture and 
society as understood from the perspective of legal rules and processes.  The 
goal in this effort is to understand the way rulemakers maintain the 
provisional autonomy of the legal sphere, and this embraces a key 
anthropological objective to depict institutions and practices from the 
“native’s point of view”.7  Since Malinowski’s initial fieldwork on tribal 
crime in the Trobriand Islands, this goal has become the common 
denominator of most ethnographic field research.  And yet, it has not 
prevented legal anthropologists from treating law perennially from the 
outside. 8   That is because, among other things, its writers have become 
preoccupied with the “spaces in between” social groups, cultures, and 
epistemes.  One result of this reflexivity has also been a preoccupation with 
interfaces between disciplines: “where we stand and who are our ‘Others’?” 9 
But, the dominance  of this question has forestalled development of theories 
and methods useful to academic law the way, notably, economics has been in 
the development of tort theory. 10   However, this is not to say that 
anthropology should be un-reflexive; its introspection has been necessary in 
coming to grips with its dubious role in colonial projects past and present.  
                                                           
 6. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 13 (1986) (“Theories that ignore the structure of legal 
argument for supposedly larger questions of history and society are therefore perverse. They ignore 
questions about the internal character of legal argument, so their explanations are impoverished and 
defective . . . .  It was Oliver Wendell Holmes who argued most influentially, I think, for this kind of 
‘external’ legal theory, the depressing history of social-theoretic jurisprudence in our century warns us 
how wrong he was.”).  
 7. See Clifford Geertz, From the Native’s Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological 
Understanding, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (3rd ed. 
2000) [hereinafter Geertz I].   
 8. See BRONISLAW MALINOWKSI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926); see also MARCUS 
GEORGE E. & MICHAEL M. J. FISCHER, ANTHROPOLOGY AS CULTURAL CRITIQUE 18 (1986) 
(“Ethnography is a research process in which the anthropologist closely observes, records, and engages in 
the daily life of another culture—an experience labeled as the fieldwork method—and then writes 
accounts of this culture, emphasizing descriptive detail.”). 
 9. John Comaroff, Dialectical Systems, History and Anthropology:  Units of Study and Questions of 
Theory, 8 J. OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STUDIES 143, 144 (1982) (“In my own view, there ought to be no 
‘relationship’ between history and anthropology, since there should be no division to begin with. A theory 
of society which is not also a theory of history, or vice versa, is hardly a theory at all.”); see also Rena 
Lederman, Comparative “Research”: A Modest Proposal Concerning the Object of Ethics Regulation, 30 
POLITICAL AND LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REVIEW 319, 319 (2007). 
 10. See, e.g., John C. Moorehouse, Law and Economics and Tort Law:  A Survey of Scholarly Opinion, 
62 ALB. L. REV. 667, 667–68 (1998).  
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But productive self-evaluation and productivity are two different things.  
Why then, should legal anthropology be productive and how can this be 
gauged?   
While the subfield takes as its key occupation the ethnographic or 
ethnological study of law and law-like activity, I wish to understand its 
productivity here in terms of positive influence upon formal law in both 
scholastic and professional modalities.11  Thus, this article proceeds in four 
stages to suggest that legal anthropology take greater stock of the provisional 
autonomy of law.  First, in Part II below, it briefly introduces the context and 
gravity of the problem including missed opportunities to predict and forestall 
recent incidents of large-scale injustice.  This assertion relies upon an 
understanding of law under global governance as occulted—a term I have 
developed elsewhere to mean hidden behind increasingly global legal 
knowledge and expertise—and upon the notion that ethnography of law, 
nearly by definition, may have its ear to the ground ahead of looming 
crises.12  Second, the article draws attention in Part III to early critical rapport 
between the disciplines in three historic moments.  Here,  “historic” need not 
be read as “in the past.”  These moments present problems that are still very 
current today in the debates about legal anthropological relevance.  Showing 
this, Part IV explores the problems of relevance in recent approaches to legal 
anthropology and their solubility within modern legal practice and teaching.  
Finally, borrowing from Latour’s seminal contribution to science and 
technology studies, Part V presents the notion of legal black boxes with 
recourse to their manifestation in the doctrinal law of torts. 
 
II.  LAW IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:  COMPLEXITY, INFLUENCE, 
OCCULTATION 
 
The view of anthropology from the legal academy has never been more 
significant.  Over the past fifteen years, rules about global warfare, 13 
financial markets,14 corporate citizenship,15 and regional governance16 have 
                                                           
 11. Other empirical fields that have come to be influential upon law are less self-conscious of 
distinctions between “pure” and “applied” research.  Applied in this context is probably best replaced by 
the term relevant. 
 12. Riaz Tejani, Crisis and Constitution: French Antiracism and Belonging in the New Legal Order of 
Europe (May 10, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with Mudd 
Library, Princeton University).  
 13. See, e.g., Ganesh Moorehouse, Counterinsurgency, The War On Terror, And The Laws Of War, 95 
VA. L. REV. 1745 (2009); see also David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A 
Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123 (2006). 
 14. See, e.g., Fiona Haines, Regulatory Failures and Regulatory Solutions: A Characteristic Analysis 
of the Aftermath of Disaster, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 31 (2009). 
 15. E.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010). 
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drastically evolved to have wider influence on private lives and bodies while 
simultaneously appearing to fade from sight.17  More importantly, these rules 
have changed largely with decreasing comment or resistance from lay 
people.18  That faceless group, or “public,” has not only been rendered more 
passive to the large scale development and enforcement of rules in global 
context, it is often unaware or uninformed of them.19  As governance and 
rulemaking become increasingly global and technologized in scope and form, 
the public whose behavior is regulated enjoys less participation in and 
understanding of the process.  Legitimacy is maintained, however, by the 
entrustment of rulemaking in the hands of increasingly specialized “experts” 
whose knowledge is considered beyond the reach of most.20  Elsewhere, I 
have written of the role such “occult” knowledge played in the demise of the 
2005 European Constitution in France.21  There, increased regionalization of 
norms and rulemaking left a significant gap between decision-making power 
and its bases—a “democratic deficit” in the words of some.22 
This being the case, fieldwork-based legal anthropology would appear 
well poised to furnish advance insight on the local “realities” affected by 
such global governance shifts.  And in some cases, it has already furnished 
such insight.  However, the influence of these studies on mainstream law 
                                                                                                                                         
 16. See Nicholas Kulish & Paul Geitner, Euro Zone Crisis Boils as Leaders Fail to Signal New Steps, 
N.Y. Times, May 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/world/europe/euro-crisis-intensifies-as-
leaders-bicker.html?pagewanted=all; see also Floyd Norris, As Europe’s Currency Union Frays, 
Conspiracy Theories Fly, N.Y. Times, June 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/business/as-
europes-currency-union-frays-conspiracy-theories-fly.html?pagewanted=all. 
 17. One paradox of neo-liberal economic and social policies more generally. See, e.g., CAROL 
GREENHOUSE, THE PARADOX OF RELEVANCE:  ETHNOGRAPHY AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2011) [hereinafter GREENHOUSE I].  
 18. Meant here in its descriptive sense, the phrase captures the vast population of citizens and residents 
who go about their daily lives without the power to spontaneously act upon the structures and rules of 
government.  To deny that such a group exists, or to label them in less clear terms, is to contribute to their 
invisibility.  See also RONALD NIEZEN, PUBLIC JUSTICE AND THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW 1 (2010).  A 
similar awkwardness is necessary in the faceless notion of “publics,”  “[P]ublics, however intangible, have 
also become part of the social worlds of those whom it is possible to know intimately.”  
 19. See, e.g., Anthony Fowler & Michele Margolis, The Political Consequences of Uninformed Voters 
(MIT Political Sci. Dep’t Research Paper No. 2011-12, 2011). 
 20. See, e.g., ARTHUR GOLDWAG, CULTS, CONSPIRACIES, AND SECRET SOCIETIES (2009). One index of 
this development has been a rise in conspiracy theories.  The World Wide Web abounds with sites 
analyzing conspiracies behind the Kennedy assassinations, moon landing, and September 11th among 
many others.    
 21. Tejani, supra note 12.  Occult in this sense means hidden from view but for a select few, experts, or 
elites.  Unlike other forms of normativity premised upon self-dominance such as disciplinary power or 
hegemony, occultation of law in these contexts is premised upon the “unknowability” of complex rules 
and processes inscribed into legal doctrine.  It remains whether unknowability is a proper object of 
ethnographic study.  See NIEZEN, supra note 18, at 1.  I join Niezen’s view to “brake with the source of 
anthropologists’ disciplinary identity by discussing social actors who are intangible, abstract, notoriously 
unpredictable and largely unknowable.”  Id. 
 22. DAVID MARQUAND, PARLIAMENT FOR EUROPE 64 (1979); see also DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 64 (2006).  
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research and teaching has remained  minor.23  This is unfortunate because 
while anthropologists serve an important documentary and interpretive role 
in late-modern,Western societies, their greatest potential contribution may be 
to influence law and policy through accounts of everyday lives influenced by 
and legitimating abstract decisions of which many run counter to 
communities’ own economic and social interests.24       
   
III.  CRITICAL PREHISTORY:  EVOLUTIONISM, LAW IN ACTION, AND LEGAL 
REALISM 
  
Today’s palpable gulf between anthropology and law, however, may be 
exceptional.  While the two were discrete in their conceptions of evidence 
and methodology, these differences were once well-articulated and 
productive.  Sociocultural anthropology emerged and grew largely on the 
basis of ethnological and ethnographic studies of norms and dispute 
resolution so that law, in short, fueled the furnace of the burgeoning new 
“science of culture.”25  Meanwhile, those early studies were conducted by 
trained jurists and came to influence the development of hard law in the new 
metropolitan nation-states. 26   Nations and nationalism emerged as new 
“imagined” or “represented communities” and early legal anthropology 
helped define the boundary between metropolitan subjects of history and 
their “Others” held over from a bygone era.27  At the same time, ethnography 
was rendered more important by calls to understand law in movement rather 
than as static doctrine.  Three watershed moments in this early rapport are 
often noted:  (1) the popularization of evolutionism in law by Sir Henry 
Maine; (2) the rupture between law in books and law in action signaled by 
Roscoe Pound; and (3) the elucidation of legal realism via the “law jobs” of 
Karl Llewellyn.  Each of these figures was a legal scholar who brought 
sociocultural insight about law back into the legal academy in ways still 
visible today.  
 
                                                           
 23. See Annalise Riles, Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and the Rhetoric of 
Interdisciplinarity U. ILL. L. REV. 597 (1994).  For some, this feeling is mutual.  See LAWRENCE ROSEN, 
LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION, 63 (2006) (“[M]any American scholars have undeniable prejudice 
against law.  Like their countrymen, they tend to think of law as a domain of specialists, rife with strange 
terminology and far from disinterested maneuvering.”) 
 24. See David Runciman, Why Do People Vote Against Their Own Self Interest?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 
2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8474611.stm; see also Charles Simic, Age of Ignorance, N.Y. REV. OF 
BOOKS BLOG, (March 20, 2012, 10:25 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/mar/20/age-of-
ignorance/.  
 25. George Peter Murdock, The Science of Culture, 34 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 200 (1932). 
 26. This was possible as the new Westphalian international order assumed each nation would be 
governed by one state with one law, and that each state would be legitimated by one nation. 
 27. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (2d ed. 1983); JOHN KELLY & MARTHA KAPLAN, 
REPRESENTED COMMUNITIES: FIJI AND WORLD DECOLONIZATION (2001).  





Henry Maine is sometimes considered the foundational legal 
anthropologist—a primacy indicative of his historicity and wide scholarly 
exposure.28  He was the first Anglos-Saxon jurist to formally analyze South 
Asian legal norms, and his “status to contract” theory came to typify the 
evolutionist thinking that European metropolitan law was more advanced in 
form and systematicity than its counterparts among non-Western peoples.29  
But this assertion was widely discredited even as it came to be reinvoked 
time and again in contract law casebooks.30  Today, few wish to support the 
overt racialism underpinning evolution; nevertheless, Maine continues to be 
reinvoked with some frequency. 
One of the greater lessons found in revisitations of Maine may be the 
apparent dislike he harbored for legal practice.31  Annalise Riles has written 
that such disdain is suggestive of Maine’s great consciousness of 
“disciplinarity”—the role that anthropology could play in conversations with 
law on the topic of context and culture.32  We might, however, also view it as 
indicative of something deeper: legal anthropology’s early difficulty with 
expertise.  Viewed in certain perspective, Maine illustrates the beginning of a 
rift between legal culture and profession—a foundational preference to view 
and understand law at sites removed from the locus of metropolitan legal 
practice in his time.  Indeed, his acceptance of an administrative post in India 
subsequent to bar admission suggests that he preferred the ethnological 
theorization afforded by colonial positioning over head-to-head interlocution 
at the English bar.33   
This preference was more than conceptual; it was practical.  As with the 
pursuit of dual studies in law and anthropology today, the demands of legal 
profession and the demands of ethnographic fieldwork can become mutually 
exclusive.  For Maine to compose Ancient Law, his position in India would 
be far more consequential than one among the English courts.  And yet, what 
did this mean for professional relevance of his work and later legal 
anthropologies following it?  Would there be a way to create relevant theory 
on legal culture while developing a keen understanding of the way law is 
                                                           
 28. See Carol Greenhouse, Just in Time:  Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of Law, 98 YALE 
L. J. 1631, 1632 (1998); JOHN CONLEY & WILLIAM O’BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS:  THE 
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 3 (1990).  
 29. See, e.g., NORBERT ROULAND, LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 228–29 (Phillippe Planel trans., 1994).  
 30. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 19 (1986). 
 31. Riles, supra note 23, at 608.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 608–09.  Maine’s role in British colonial administration saw him engaged in governance 
rather than advocacy.   
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practiced in any given context or are these epistemologies inherently 
insoluble?  And once such appreciation was cultivated, to what extent would 
it be generalizable in the way jurists hope cultural meta-theory to be?  
Even more fundamentally, what would be the role of generalizability 
across these disciplines?  Legal anthropology has since eschewed sweeping 
meta-theory—notions that try to explain globally the distribution of other 
notions—of the kind Maine promulgated. Meanwhile, academic law has 
further embraced such sweeping theories when plausible with open arms in a 
way that partakes of the interdisciplinarity I began with above.34  But, if 
confirmation of such theories in science occurs through experimentation and 
observation, in law it occurs through through stable rule creation and 
enforcement.  Meta-theory in law beyond a certain threshold of plausibility, 
therefore, is always “confirmed” when it creates the worlds into which it is 
born. 
While Maine’s documented legacy has been the influence of “status to 
contract” in casebook introductions and law and society article footnotes, we 
might view him here as his own symbol for the early practical 
incommensurability between legal culture and profession among 




Roscoe Pound’s 1910 article “Law in Books and Law in Action” 
introduced a second seminal moment.35  There, Pound argued that law was 
drastically more than the sum of its doctrines and rather entailed (and thus 
required study of) law as practiced and lived by its constituents.36   The 
concept expanded the venues of law to include nondoctrinal—though still 
formal—settings like courtrooms, firms, legislatures, clinics, police 
precincts, and so on.37 
For Pound, this move was animated by a belief that access to American 
justice was bifurcating along class lines.38  “The malefactor of means,” he 
wrote, “the rogue who has an organization of rogues behind him to provide a 
lawyer and amount of habeas corpus has the benefit of law in the books.”39  
                                                           
 34. See, e.g., Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase 
Theorem, 116 ECON. J. 223, 223–45 (2006).  Ronald Coase’s “irrelevance theorem” has been widely 
accepted and promoted as a rationale behind economic jurisprudence in Tort Law.  See R.H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960).  
 35. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). 
 36. Id.  
 37. John Hanson & Michael McCann, Situational Torts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1345, 1389 (2008). 
 38. Pound, supra note 35, at 17. 
 39. Id. (“The fact remains, however, that the attempt of the books to compel prosecutors to use only a 
case-knife is failing. They will use the pickaxe in practice, and until the law has evolved some device by 
which they may use it in all cases the weak and friendless and lowly will be at a practical disadvantage, 
despite legal theory.”). 
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Inverting American revolutionary suspicions of monarchic justice—in which 
a sovereign adjudicator could be arbitrary and irreproachable—Pound decries 
the arbitrariness of textualized legal rules for their susceptibility to creative, 
expert wielders.  The law of “books” is a luxury out of reach to the pauper, 
and a tool for manipulation and cunning for the wealthy.  Such inequality 
demanded that this new distinction between formal and applied law be better 
understood within the academy and the profession.  Pound’s classed vision of 
justice is instructive today.  Formalized law, it holds, is not accessible to 
laypersons, and is, rather, mediated by a tier of experts trained in the 
language and posture of legal argumentation.  In today’s world, many hold a 
reinverted view of justice wherein formal rules generally ensnare the 
common person, while the exceptional person of means is thought to receive 
“special treatment” or “celebrity justice.”40 
The rift between books and action opened up studies of law to “law in 
society.”  Though the modern trend in legal anthropology has been to place 
heavier emphasis on the “society” side of this formulation, law in action 
carried a sense—evident in Pound’s account—that formal institutions still 
remained the key framework through which to view “action.”  While one 
major strand in legal anthropology influenced by the work of Michel 
Foucault would come to view action elsewhere, this original formulation of 
law in action seems to have influenced a narrow group of modern legal 
anthropologists who successfully steer close to the shores of legal 
institutions. 
One example may be Law and Community in Three American Towns, an 
illuminating collaboration by Greenhouse, Yngvesson, and Engel. 41  
Separately, the authors conducted and drew up ethnographic field studies in 
American small towns in the 1980s.42  The choice of field sites allowed them 
to observe legal behavior among residents both at the early stage of dispute 
formation and choice to litigate, as well as at the later stages of court filing 
and appearances.  But these sites also allow larger observations about the 
changing nature of small town life in America in an era of 
deindustrialization, increased immigration, and rapid population flight from 
rural to urban life.  Latour has offered another impressive update on “law in 
action” in his 2010 study of the French Conseil d’Etat.43  There, he observed 
sessions of the Conseil and drew observations about its reasoning and 
                                                           
 40. See, e.g., Theodore J. Boutrous & Michael H. Dore, Celebrity Justice: A New Double Standard, 22 
COMM. LAW. 3 (2004); see also Jared Chamberlain et al., Celebrities in the Courtroom: Legal Responses, 
Psychological Theory and Empirical Research, 3 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 551 (2006).  
 41. CAROL J. GREENHOUSE ET AL., LAW AND COMMUNITY IN THREE AMERICAN TOWNS (1994) 
[hereinafter GREENHOUSE II].  
 42. Id. 
 43. BRUNO LATOUR, THE MAKING OF LAW: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE CONSEIL D’ETAT (2009). 
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assumptions, all in a period in which French national legal culture was 
undergoing dramatic changes.44  These examples are exceptional in that they 
remain more “institutional” in choice of field site than much legal 
anthropological empirical work today.  They can be considered illustrative of 
the law in action influence on anthropology, but that influence remains 





If Maine and Pound highlighted the problem of expertise, Karl Llewellyn 
stood for a plausible solution: the placement of law and law-like activity 
along a single spectrum of social practice.  This conceptual merger was 
articulated in his ethnographic collaboration with anthropologist E. Adamson 
Hoebel.45  There, Llewellyn and Hoebel describe what they term the “law 
jobs,” the diffuse legal practices spread among various actors in the 
Cheyenne tribes.46  Written in 1941, the work explores law in its diffuse loci 
as something belonging to an entire tribe rather than just its experts.47 
The “law-jobs” were comprised of five elements that, he felt, 
transcended all legal contexts from ancient to modern.48   These included 
what Llewellyn termed:  (1) disposition of trouble-cases; (2) preventive 
channeling and reorientation of conduct and expectations; (3) allocation of 
authority and arrangement of procedures which legitimatize action as being 
authoritative; and (4) the net organization of the group as a whole to provide 
direction and incentive.49  But interestingly, despite typology of these diffuse 
behaviors, Llewellyn did not challenge a key distinction about law as, at 
once, more grave and more violent than mere customary norms.  “Normative 
generalization,” he wrote, “is part of what goes to generate and to make up 
the ‘legal’; it is not the whole . . . .  It must be more; it reaches beyond the 
normation of oughtness into the imperative of mustness.” 50   The whole 
purpose of this conversion from norm to rule, we learn, is to secure the 
reproduction of the society against anomic forces of individualism, deviance, 
and so forth. 
                                                           
 44. Id.  
 45. See E. ADAMSON HOEBEL & KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CHEYENNE WAY:  CONFLICT AND CASE LAW 
(1941). 
 46. Id.; see generally Llewellyn, supra note 1. 
 47. HOEBEL & LLEWELLYN, supra note 45. 
 48. Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 1374 (“[T]he law-jobs hold, as basic functions, for every human 
group . . . .  They are implicit in the concept of ‘groupness.’”). 
 49. Id. at 1373. 
 50. Id. at 1364. 
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The law-jobs seem to augur the kind of thinking later addressed by 
Foucault via “disciplinary power.” 51  But Llewellyn and Hoebel offer an 
account where law meets legal culture in a way that is optimistic about both 
human nature and the sophistication of Cherokee problem solving.52  Later, 
Foucault provides an explanation for the coexistence of State and 
interpersonal power relations in a way meant to capture a human drive for 
coercion.  The two overlap in the implicit recognition of the role of legal 
culture in law’s efficiency.  Given this overlap, it might appear lawyers and 
anthropologists would have much to talk about.            
Yet, while readings of both Llewellyn and Foucault may begin at a 
common locus of “legal culture,” they quickly veer off in different and 
influential directions.  Disciplinary power gave rise to the practice in social 
sciences of studying law far from its sources of emanation.  Beginning in the 
1970s and continuing up to the present, ethnographers took the study of law 
to contexts as disparate as urban gangs, punk music scenes, and biomedical 
engineering.  At all of these sites, ethnographers argued, one could witness 
the influence of and negotiation with “the law.”  Indeed, it began to appear 
that the true substance of the law—its raw material—lay simply in day-to-day 
human relations.  The popularity of sociocultural studies of law premised 
upon disciplinary power might be read as one example of the wider success 
and influence of first wave legal realism.53 
Ongoing interest in Maine, Pound, and Llewellyn paints a promising 
picture of the sociocultural study of law within the legal academy.54  Though 
none were trained anthropologists, each championed ethnological and 
ethnographic approaches to support propositions about the law and the 
reinsertion of those approaches into studies of Anglo-American legal 
doctrine.  Few if any subsequent thinkers have approached the integrated 
influence of these figures.  Instead, sociocultural legal studies have come to 
generate rich narratives of law in the “local” context but rarely directed 
lessons from those back toward law as a practice or profession.   
 
 
                                                           
 51. See, e.g., id. at 1392 (“In the main, machinery ‘legal’ in character, and personnel ‘official’ in 
character, have best potentiality for accomplishing the ‘law-jobs.’  But rarely, in any culture, and never in 
a culture both developed and mobile, can official ‘legal’ machinery and personnel accomplish the whole 
of those jobs.  What is wanted is an on-going optimum balance, keeping in the hands of the official ‘legal’ 
machinery and personnel, and well-handled by them, so much as they can best handle.”). 
 52. Id at 1373. 
 53. Bix, supra note 4, at 980. 
 54. All three of these men are extraordinarily accomplished scholars.  Maine held a professorship in 
jurisprudence and law at Oxford and Cambridge, Pound taught law at Northwestern and Chicago and 
became Dean at Harvard Law School, and Llewellyn taught law at Yale, Columbia, and Chicago. 
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IV.  THE PROBLEM OF RELEVANCE 
 
In her trenchant work, The Paradox of Relevance,55 Carol Greenhouse 
explores the problem of relevance in anthropology amid its contemporary 
sociopolitical context.  There, she posits that the dilemma results not from 
inherent disciplinary turns but rather from the object of ethnography shifting 
away from collective notions of meaning and “Self” toward increasingly 
individualized forms of belonging.56  A similar observation might now be 
drawn about law under new regimes of global governance.57  Changes in 
legal cultural conditions have eschewed the community bases of norms and 
emphasized abstract institutions, processes, and administration.  Far reaching 
global warfare and financial collapse have been key products of this, and 
each was enabled by the cultural shift Greenhouse describes.  By their very 
nature, they have escaped anticipation and description by contemporary legal 
ethnographic fieldwork and necessitate a reorentiation of the kind for which 
this article advocates.  To be more specific, the subfield might now include in 
its prospective audience judges, lawyers, and lawmakers—experts whom it 
might take in new orientations as its native interlocutors. 
In order to do this, the it must contend with one particular dilemma.  On 
one hand, legal anthropology tends to hold that law is not just the domain and 
material of governmental institutions and their experts, and rather the entire 
complex of norms and control that interleave the contextual society.  On the 
other hand, laypersons, particularly those within the complex urban societies 
to which legal anthropologists often look when they speak about law, 
generally do not see law in this way.  Instead, they look to it as very much 
the province of trained and skilled experts.  Whether they should or not is a 
separate matter; so long as anthropology—ethnography, to be precise—is a 
descriptive endeavor, it must take stock of the experience of everyday actors.  
Significantly, those individuals do not typically experience law as “diffuse” 
in the way that legal anthropology would expect them to.  
This is, at bottom, a problem of “seeing.”58  While we would not often 
admit it, legal anthropologists by and large are viewing law from the 
                                                           
 55. GREENHOUSE I, supra note 17. 
 56. See id. at 34 (“[T]he calls for relevance could only make more pressing the question of what 
relevance could actually mean in practice . . . . The fact that relevance was presented as a mediating path 
in relation to anthropology’s internal debates implied that anthropologists had only themselves to blame if 
the public overwhelmingly communicated through other channels.  In retrospect, this accusation misses 
the mark.  It was politics that abandoned society as social—the basis of social security—and failed the 
people with whom anthropologists most readily identified, that is, minority communities at the social 
margins.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 57. See NIEZEN, supra note 18, at 4 (“[T]he institutions of global governance are built upon ideas of 
effecting change among non-compliant peoples in the interest of furthering cosmopolitan values of peace 
and development.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Riaz Tejani, The Vanishing Point:  Humanity, Vision, and Value Theory in the Age of 
Economic Globalization, 20 ALTERNATE ROUTES 132 (2004) (suggesting that the conceptual distinction 
between humans and their others is based upon the visualization of nature as exchange value). 
2013 LITTLE BLACK BOXES 141 
 
 
outside—what they sometimes call the etic perspective.59  That is, the role of 
the ethnographer in legal contexts, even those far from the institutions of 
sovereign power, is less one of participant and more one of observer.  
Almost by definition, such contexts do not lend themselves to real 
“participation” as would other kinds of fieldwork.  The researcher is usually 
not a stakeholder in the proceedings or resolution, nor is she typically an 
advocate or adjudicator. 60   So, while legal anthropology can often only 
observe law in core contexts such as these “from the margins,” it has been 
adept at observing fast evolving or remote “law-like” situations.  Our 
accounts of the margins, interstices, and remote occurrences of law and law-
like activity require that we be honest about the way law really works, for 
better and for worse, in ways that regulate everyday behavior. 
A first step in this direction might be to provisionally redefine the legal 
“native” as expert, and to therefore take the “expert’s point of view.”  There, 
from the perspective of legally trained and licensed law practitioner or 
adjudicator, law is not “everywhere you find it.”  More to the point, for these 
actors, a world of difference exists between “law” on one hand and “law-
like” on the other.  Practice is geared toward specific problems.  Problems 
must be solved.  Solutions come with outcomes.  Outcomes impact lives.  
And the path between each of these is paved with rules, codes, procedures, 
forms, argument structures, and patterns of reasoning.  Each of these in most 
cases, have been learned or experienced through years of law school training, 
months of bar preparation, threshold evaluation in one bar examination or 
more, and finally the practical experience of a kind only licensed individuals 
are permitted to attain.  Reckoning with these practicalities has remained thin 
in legal anthropological writing.  Perhaps one reason is that few scholars 
know firsthand the exigencies of both fieldwork and legal practice, or their 




                                                           
 59. See Geertz I, supra note 7, at 56. 
 60. See, e.g., James Clifford, Identity in Mashpee, in LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY:  A READER 178 
(Sally Falk Moore ed., 2005).  There, the author observing a legal proceeding on the very sensitive topic 
of American Indian tribal status could only watch from the audience as the tribe’s advocates pled their 
case before a judge.  Since Clifford was not an anthropologist but rather a historian, his work attempted 
fieldwork but stopped short of talking to people involved in the trial.  Fieldwork is not generally a method 
of historiography, and one wonders if the partiality of Clifford’s method resulted more from practical 
limitations about observing law in context than from a real, preformulated, disciplinary outlook on what 
should be done in such contexts.  There are rare exceptions to this.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE:  LAW AS CULTURE IN ISLAMIC LAW 1 (1989) (author describing his first 
court appearance on behalf of an Indian tribe following his own legal training). 
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A. Reading Evidence: Interpretivism, Reflexivity, Comparativism 
 
Within sociocultural anthropology, evidence often consists of field notes 
and interview transcripts.  By those two means, researchers learn of 
informant worldviews based upon what they are told and shown.  With 
respect to legal anthropology, the most apparent problem with this approach 
under new complex legal regimes is that laypersons increasingly do not know 
where legal rules originate or how they are applied.  In tribal societies—the 
inaugural object of legal anthropology—law emerged from customary norms 
to become formalized as legal rules in what Paul Bohannan famously called 
“double institutionalization.”61 Today, in many instances, legal rules migrate.  
They are developed from institutions outward, or are borrowed from one 
community and applied to another.  The interaction and impact of such rules 
with and upon anthropological informants may not be accurately captured by 
the dominant approach of interpretivism—the capturing of native 
interpretations of local worlds.  Limited reception of legal anthropology 
within the legal academy today may well be rooted in this insufficiency.   
More broadly, the history of ethnographic empiricism—the record to 
which interpretivism responds—has been problematic and destabilizing.  At 
its origin, ethnographic fieldwork was conducted in the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century by colonial missionaries.62  Many of these missionaries 
sought to document and learn native languages and belief systems, often with 
the aim of fostering rapport and religious conversion.63  Through written 
correspondence, these early ethnographers would transmit notes back to 
scholars in English or French universities who then drew up sweeping 
theories about “primitive man” based on cross-cultural comparison or 
ethnology.64 
Because of this dubious history, ethnographic empiricism has long 
carried the stain of colonialism.  Not only were its early insights used to 
better “know” the native peoples whom it dominated, they were often 
                                                           
 61. See Paul Bohannon, The Differing Realms of Law, in LAW AND WARFARE: STUDIES IN THE 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONFLICT 43–56 (Paul Bohannon ed., 1967). 
 62. See George W. Stocking, Jr., Colonial Situations, in COLONIAL SITUATIONS: ESSAYS ON THE 
CONTEXTUALIZATIONS OF ETHNOGRAPHIC KNOWLEDGE 3, 4 (1991) [hereinafter Colonial Situations]; see 
also John Cinnamon, Missionary Expertise, Social Science, and the Uses of Ethnographic Knowledge in 
Colonial Gabon, 6 HIST. IN AFR. 413 (2006).  
 63. See Colonial Situations, supra note 62, at 4. 
 64. See GEORGE W. STOCKING, JR., AFTER TYLOR: BRITISH SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 1888–1951, at 15 
(1995).  
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utilized in their domination as well. 65   But in the interwar and postwar 
periods, the goal of ethnography shifted from surveillance and 
documentation toward advocacy.  It sought to defend native beliefs and 
practices on the eve of their apparent disappearance under colonial contact 
and pressure.66  
With this new prioritization of native life came a belief in the internal 
logic and wisdom of native worldviews.  Such worldviews, and their 
understanding through ever-closer approximation of local interpretation, 
came to be called interpretivism.  Interpretive anthropology viewed culture as 
native text, constantly undergoing interpretation and reinscription with 
meaning.  This line of thought later spawned cultural studies—a less 
empiricist and more far-reaching field interested in the semiology of Western 
popular and ethnic culture.  The powerful influence of interpretive 
anthropology on knowledge production may have limited the uptake of new 
accounts in related applied disciplines.67 
In one of the great fleeting moments of rapport between law and 
anthropology, Clifford Geertz delivered a series of lectures at Yale that 
eventually became the content for his key essay Local Knowledge.68  There, 
Geertz grappled with the cold relations between law and anthropology, 
attempting to reconcile them with recourse to law’s anthropological 
tendencies.69  Comparing the concepts of haqq, dharma, and adat found in 
the Arab, Hindu, and Malay cultures, respectively, Geertz tells the Yale 
audience that in each of these concepts lies the conceptual merger of fact and 
law that always already entails the intimacy of law and culture.70  Law from 
                                                           
 65. See generally TALAL ASAD, ANTHROPOLOGY & THE COLONIAL ENCOUNTER (1973) (Talal Asad 
ed., 1979) (discussing the ways in which anthropological thinking and practice have been affected by 
British colonialism);  see also Diane Lewis, Anthropology and Colonialism, 14 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY, no. 5, Dec. 1973, at 582 (“Since anthropology emerged along with the expansion of 
Europe and the colonization of the non-Western world, anthropologists found themselves participants in 
the colonial system which organized relationships between Westerners and non-Westerners.  It is, perhaps, 
more than a coincidence that a methodological stance, that of the outsider, and a methodological approach, 
‘objectivity’ developed which in retrospect seem to have been influenced by, and in turn to have 
supported, the colonial system.”). 
 66. See, e.g., Claude Levi-Strauss, Race and History, in 2 STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1976).  This 
work was originally delivered as a lecture to UNESCO. 
 67. See MARCUS & FISCHER, supra note 10, at xi (noting a “marked decline of government interest in, 
and support for, research in a number of fields, including anthropology”). 
 68. Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL 
KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167 (1983) [hereinafter Geertz II]. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at 214–15:  
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the native’s point of view is a cosmology in which norms and the factual 
“world” upon which they act are linked.  To be part of any local world, in 
this way, is to be a subject of its rules.  Geertz gives as example a case in 
which one Indonesian tribesman name Regreg loses his wife to a man from 
another village.71  Because of the strain this puts on him, Regreg refuses to 
serve on the chiefly council governing the tribe at a time when he would be 
otherwise compelled to do so.72  It is his turn, and there is no contemplated 
alternative to service.73  Yet, he has neither the mind nor motivation to serve, 
leading in turn to further agony.74  “Refusal,” we are told, “is tantamount to 
resigning not just from the village but from the human race.”75  Construal of 
the world in terms sanctioned by the prevailing norms of any one locality 
becomes, in short, requisite to worldly existence.  Presenting this insight to a 
law school audience, Geertz fulfilled the role that he would become most 
respected for: ambassador between the disciplines.  He was only the second 
anthropologist invited to speak in the Storrs Lecture Series,76 and had, just by 
“being there”, helped signal the importance of culture to law recognized at 
                                                                                                                                         
[M]y intent has not been, as I mentioned earlier, to compress Islamic, Indic, and Malaysian 
notions about the interconnections of norms and happenings into some handbook for ex 
patria litigants but to demonstrate that they are notions.  The main approaches to 
comparative law—that which sees its task as one of contrasting rule structures one to the 
next and that which sees it as one of contrasting different processes of dispute resolution in 
different societies—both seem to me rather to miss this point: the first through an 
overautonomous view of law as a separate and self-contained “legal system” struggling to 
defend its analytic integrity in the face of the conceptual and moral sloppiness of ordinary 
life; the second through an overpolitical view of it as an undifferentiated, pragmatically 
ordered collection of social devices for advancing interests and managing power conflicts.  
Whether the adjudicative styles that gather around the Anschauungen projected by ḥaqq, 
dharma, and adat are properly to be called “law” or not (the rule buffs will find them too 
informal, the dispute buffs too abstract) is of minor importance; though I, myself, would 
want to do so.  What matters is that their imaginative power not be obscured.  They do not 
just regulate behavior, they construe it.  
Id. (internal footnote omitted). 
 71. See id. at 176. 
 72. See id. at 176–77. 
 73. See id. at 177. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See Geertz II, supra note 68, at 177:  
You lose your house-land, for that is village-owned here, and become a vagrant.  You lose 
your right to enter the village temples, and thus are cut off from contact with the gods.  You 
lose, of course, your political rights—seat on the council, participation in public events, 
claims to public assistance, use of public property, all matters of great substance here; you 
lose your rank, your inherited place in the castelike order of regard, a matter of even greater 
substance.  And beyond that, you lose the whole social world, for no one in the village may 
speak to you on pain of fine.  It is not precisely capital punishment.  But for the Balinese, 
who have a proverb, ‘to leave the community of agreement [adat, a sovereign word whose 
ambiguities I shall be returning to at some length later on] is to lie down and die,’ it is the 
next best thing to it. 
Id. 
 76. The Storrs Lecture Series, one of Yale Law School's oldest and most prestigious lecture programs, 
was established in 1889.  These annual lectures are given by an American or foreign jurist or scholar who 
is not ordinarily a member of the regular faculty of the Law School. 
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one of the highest disciplinary levels.77   And yet, likely for the reasons 
addressed below, the luster of the moment quickly faded and with it, the 
influence of interpretive anthropology on legal scholarship.78  
Three key tenets of interpretive anthropology’s empirical approach may 
have posed a problem for legal scholars.  First is the notion that 
ethnographers are describing their object legal cultures from within.  This 
softens the empirical approach to describe not simply what the researcher 
sees, but local interpretations of what is being seen.  From inside the 
fieldwork project, this mandate is incredibly challenging and fruitful.  It 
requires the researcher to attempt to delve into the native mindset, its 
Anschauungen to echo Geertz’s teutonism.79  Even if this goal is never fully 
achieved, its pursuit is what leads to some of the greatest insights in the 
fieldwork endeavor.80 
But lawyers talk to people in their own way.  The interview is as 
important to their enterprise as it is to ethnography, albeit within a different 
modality and set of goals.  To an Anglo-American lawyer, client 
communication is not only fundamental; it is highly stylized to illicit the 
“right” information that serves the case.  Meanwhile the ethnographer’s 
interview may actually be designed to illicit the “wrong” information—the 
kind of material that will open up unexpected avenues of inquiry in a 
potentially endless string of questioning whose real object is an entire 
cultural or sub-cultural panoramic.  And, in some sense, lawyers are “better” 
at talking to people.  Their speech is goal-oriented and measured and often 
comes at times when their interlocutors are suffering from a dilemma which 
they are positioned to solve.   Ethnographers ask tough questions, but these 
are typically experienced by interviewees—often by design—as open-ended 
and ignorant.  Put otherwise, if the interview in professional law and field 
ethnography can be properly compared, the former sees the lawyer in the role 
of expert while the latter sees the informant as expert.  The ethnographer, 
meanwhile, and in particular when approaching legal customs and 
institutions, must operate as a layperson.             
Comparison of these professional archetype roles leads to one possible 
conclusion; that lawyers are, by training, skeptical of what they are told when 
it comes unstructured and unmediated by their own questioning.  This 
possibility becomes most credible in light of Geertz’s fact-law continuum; 
                                                           
 77. Max Gluckman was the first.  See Riles, supra note 23, at 637. 
 78. See id.; see also GREENHOUSE I, supra note 17, at 18 (“Ethnography’s literariness became an object 
of struggle and an icon of political struggles beyond the discipline . . . .”). 
 79. See Geertz II, supra note 68, at 232. 
 80. Most admit that this goal is rarely if ever “achieved.”  
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that is, law does not simply act on reality, it structures it.81  But, while this 
possibility is critical, it is not necessarily relevant.   
Here are, then, two key distinctions between the lawyer and the 
ethnographer of law.  First is the role of expert that the lawyer assumes in 
interacting with its informant and the opposite role of layperson that the 
fieldworker properly assumes in interacting with its informant.  Second is the 
goal-orientation motivating a lawyer’s often formal or stylized speech versus 
the ethnographer’s open-ended questioning.  Given these, why would 
lawyers read interpretive anthropologies that point out a social 
constructivism in which they have already been self-consciously engaged?    
Another potential difficulty of late-modern anthropology may be the 
priority granted to reflexivity.  This introspection has brought great 
advancements by situating the researcher in relation to her object of study 
and her audience and by attending to doubts raised by that situation.  It has 
produced insight on the fieldworker’s own motives and experience, and has 
made almost every ethnographic project a comparative one.  Nevertheless, 
reflexivity’s prevalence in empirical anthropology has a limiting effect on the 
uptake of ethnographic research by lawyers and law scholars because this 
presents a problem of generalizability for legal academics.  It marks 
qualitative research with a particularism unique to this or that author or his or 
her field site.  Meanwhile, law must itself continually struggle with the 
generality and particularity of its own principles—especially visible below in 
the normative modality of tort law.   
Finally a third potential dilemma to that uptake may be comparativism.  
This will sound heretical to some; one very succinct definition of legal 
anthropology pegs the discipline as the ethnographic and cross-cultural study 
of norms and dispute resolution.82  To consider as a limitation the “cross-
cultural” element of this study is to potentially devalue one of its most 
distinguishing traits.  It is also to discourage unparalleled opportunities for 
international and trans-regional studies of legal culture.  For purposes of 
understanding recent developments such as global governance and regional 
integration, such discouragement may seem obscurantist.  But hypotheses on 
this question do not presumptively translate to other fields such as social 
movements or global politics.  In those arenas, the comparative lessons from 
legal anthropology have made greater impact and enjoyed warmer reception.  
In the discrete community of legal academics, meanwhile, comparative legal 
culture enjoys no greater magnanimity than comparative law itself. 
Comparative law and legal anthropology have shared the common 
methodological approach of looking beyond the researcher’s own cultural 
and linguistic context.  While the latter has been based in ethnographic 
                                                           
 81. See Geertz II, supra note 68, at 170; see also ROSEN, supra note 23, at 9. 
 82. See CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER, AND COMMUNITY IN AN 
AMERICAN TOWN 28 (1986).  
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fieldwork over time in the ways described above, the former takes, as its 
object of study, not legal communities so much as legal doctrines and 
concepts compared across cultural frontiers.83  At a high level of generality, 
this has entailed comparison of principles in the various world legal systems: 
Common, Civil, Islamic, Soviet, Hindu, and Chinese Law.  But, from the 
perspective of the legal ethnographer, pure comparative law has the readily 
identifiable weakness of decontextualization.  The comparative jurist looks to 
rules and principles on a given subject within two or more legal communities 
and stands those in relation to one another. 84   The ethnographic field 
researcher enters and interacts with the communities constituted by those 
rules and principles to glean their dynamic meanings in people’s daily life.85  
Each draws conclusions based on their research, and presumably wishes for 
those conclusions to enlighten the audiences they intended.  
Further, comparative law has experienced only limited acceptance in 
mainstream legal scholarship and teaching.  One reason for this, which 
confronts legal anthropology as well, is the perennial suspicion that lessons 
offered by contexts afield are of little use to law students and represent only 
pet research interests of their instructors.  How, some would ask, does 
understanding how the qadi (judge) of Islamic law reaches a decision help to 
determine, influence, or construe the jurisprudence of Anglo-American 
judges?86  Similarly, the reflexive, social science response might ask why 
insight on Anglo-American jurisprudence must be the benchmark for the 
relevance of accounts of Islamic justice.  These counter-questions reflect a 
dispute between scholarship’sprofessional use value, and its exceptional role 
as knowledge “for its own sake.”  The former demands our research be well-
grounded and engaged but renders it susceptible to “market” demands for 
something less like knowledge and more like “information.”  The latter 
shields our research from market-driven need, but obviates the ethical 
imperative of relevance.   
 
B. Law Versus “Law-Like” Activity 
 
Anthropology has struggled to properly characterize law for much of its 
history.  Its difficulties began with the dubious partnership between research 
and political subjugation.  Early ethnological work drawing on missionary 
ethnography carried an important gravitas not just among the developing 
                                                           
 83. See Annelise Riles, Introduction: The Projects of Comparison, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 1, 5 n.12 (2001).  
 84. PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 3 (2006). 
 85. Moore, supra note 4, at 745. 
 86. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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social sciences, but among the life sciences as well.  Conclusions about 
“Man’s” evolutionary past were drawn from cultural observations among 
“primitive” peoples of the global East and South, as well as native America.  
The relevance of the discipline lay in its offering of lessons on human 
essences—the natural tendencies of mankind underpinning all other 
scientific, industrial, and artistic pursuits.  The evolutionist agenda gave way 
slowly—markedly between the two World Wars thanks to increased cross-
cultural contact—to a preservationist one.  Whatever insights primitive 
people and their cultures could supply, they would soon vanish and thus 
needed to be documented if not “salvaged.”87 
Finally, beginning in the 1960s and coinciding with human migration to 
metropolitan countries, wars of decolonization, and civil rights movements 
notably in the United States and England, sociocultural anthropology turned 
increasingly to its own metropolitan, urban contexts.88  In this move, it could 
offer in-depth, longitudinal, qualitative accounts of changes in metropolitan 
societies brought on by the increased heteroglossia of multicultural urban 
life.89  But, as this development unfolded, a new problem arose: to the extent 
that anthropology was now turned toward Western, urban society, and to the 
extent that its method had evolved to become “participant-observation,” 
what, if anything, could it offer empirically that was not already available 
through neighboring fields like urban sociology, or gonzo journalism?  And 
more specifically, was the provision of empirical data any longer its concern?  
For some associated with the interpretivism already described, the answer 
was ‘no’.  For them, anthropology was to henceforth work as a humanities 
discipline.  Unlike literature, it would read cultural practices as text.  Unlike 
history, it would treat people’s narratives as their archives. 
 For the subfield of legal anthropology, the turn to metropolitan or global 
society and concurrent humanization of the discipline and its methods has 
been challenging.  Ethnographic fieldwork no longer offers the potential of 
putative “eureka!” insights it once might have.  Few expect to deduce a 
unified theory of justice or fairness from tribal dispute resolution in the 
remote Amazon—first, because ethnography has left few stones unturned 
and few tribes unchanged; and second, because unified social theory has left 
the agenda almost everywhere.90  Further, studies of “complex” societies call 
for a different approach than did the study of “primitive” ones.  For Levi-
                                                           
 87. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Moore, supra note 4.  
 89. See generally MIKHAIL BAHKTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS 67 
(1982).  Heteroglossia is Bahktin’s term for the multiplicity of national languages presented in the literary 
novel form. 
 90. Chagnon’s famous study of the Yanomamo in Venezuela has become a symbol for these excesses.  
Chagnon portrayed the tribe as one of the last “untouched” peoples, but his critics accused him of 
infecting the Yanomamo with measles, misrepresenting their practices, and collaborating with government 
officials in their subjugation.  See PATRICK TIERNEY, DARKNESS IN EL DORADO 10 (2000). 
2013 LITTLE BLACK BOXES 149 
 
 
Strauss among the tribes of the Brazilian Amazon, the pen and notepad were 
markers of an ingenious literary magic of which no local chief was in 
possession.91  The anthropologist, for better and for worse in such contexts, 
was his or her own kind of shaman.  Even if he was ignorant of local 
practices, he approached them from a correlative position of expertise.  For 
today’s urban legal ethnographer there is little such parity of position within 
the larger framework of legal systems and institutions.  Unless trained in the 
same venues as metropolitan jurists, the ethnographer must approach these 
actors from a position of relative ignorance about doctrine, procedure, and 
practice.  Moreover, he now usually cannot count on the prestige of a new 
communication technology previously unheard of by jurist-informants.   
Perhaps for this reason field studies of legal culture have turned 
increasingly to venues far afield of formal legal institutions.  “Law-like” 
behavior became a stand-in for law, enabling fieldwork among a wider 
variety of communities and contexts.  As I am suggesting, this development 
has been a mixed blessing.  On one hand it has opened up the conceptual 
field to consider the mutual influence of law and diffuse social behavior.  On 
the other hand, it may have diluted the influence of legal anthropology in the 
mainstream legal academy.  From the perspective of legally trained experts, 
much law-like activity is a byproduct of formal legal activity. 92   The 
formalities studied and practiced in the legal profession are, from that 
position, non-negotiable.  Or, as Halperin aptly writes, “[l]aw can bite and 
often bites with a violence that is not purely symbolic”93  
Clients often see lawyers as therapists, experts who at certain cost can 
hear their problem and make it go away.  But, to do this requires more than 
hearing:  it requires translation.  And second, formalities are non-negotiable 
because they are the ways in which client problems must be articulated in a 
legally cognizable form for the adjudicator to resolve, or for opposing parties 
                                                           
 91. See CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, TRISTES TROPIQUES 296 (John Weightman & Doreen Weightman 
trans., 1992). 
 92. Civil recourse theorists, for instance, argue that one of tort law’s main functions is to provide a 
formal right to redress with such right forming ones of the individual’s due process rights.  John Goldberg, 
The Constitutional Status of Tort Law:  Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 
115 YALE L.J. 524, 626 (2005). 
 93. Jean-Louis Halperin, Law in Books and Law in Action: The Problem of Legal Change, 64 ME. L. 
REV. 45, 58 (2011); see also Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 1364.  Llewellyn also used the metaphor of 
odontological violence:   
The ‘legal’ has to do with ways and standards which will prevail in the pinch of challenge, 
with rights and the acquisition of rights which have teeth, with liberties and powers whose 
exercise can be made to stand up under attack.  Let there be no doubt about this: you can 
have law-stuff, undeniable law-stuff, which is neither right nor just; when you are put to the 
choice, you will know the ‘legal’ from the right or just because the ‘legal,’ when insisted on, 
is what prevails, and the right or just will have to suffer accordingly. 
Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 1364.  
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to respond.  The lawyer must take messy real world situations (“fact 
patterns” in more didactic terms), break them into smaller, articulable units, 
and then address them under rules and procedures already available.  
Occasionally, as novel patterns arise, she has the opportunity to suggest new 
ones.   
Acculturation to this new modality of thought and communication has 
vexed many a first-year law student.  Elizabeth Mertz has incisively written 
on language patterns in first-year courses at a wide variety of American law 
schools. 94   There, she observed the ways in which new students are 
encouraged to dissect cases in a distant and hyper-rational modality. 95  
Students are rewarded for distant application of legal principles motivated by 
well-settled policy, and discouraged from importation of affective and 
subcultural instincts on the outcome of a case.96  For others, this abstraction 
through pedagogy results in an overall professional distance that separates 
law students from their lay context by the time of graduation.97  A better 
understanding of law-like activity may shed light on this process in a few 
ways.  
First, law-like might be distinguished from law-in-action.  The latter 
begins with legal doctrine formalized at one or another level and requires 
some fixed formal rule.98  Its goal is to observe that doctrine in practice.  And 
while it is true that the practice such doctrine may give rise to will differ 
from that imagined by its architects, or vary from one context to another, 
these are still occasioned and influenced by the norm itself. 99  Ethnographers 
                                                           
 94. Elizabeth Mertz, Teaching Lawyers the Language of Law: Legal and Anthropological 
Translations, 34 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 91, 93–94: 
The distinctive epistemology that underlies legal language, as it is taught in the doctrinal 
classrooms, fits very well with overall goals and features of the legal system in the United 
States.  Thus, there is a symbolic “fit” that connects teaching method, legal language, the 
legal system, and that system’s underlying worldview.  This symbolic connection makes 
sense of the persistence of certain Socratic aspects of legal teaching, despite ongoing 
complaints about efficacy, fairness to students of differing backgrounds, and negative 
impacts on students.  The cultural logic entailed by the fundamental worldview taught to 
law students alters incipient lawyers’ orientations concerning human conflict, authority, and 
morality.  A crucial aspect of this changed orientation involves training students to read 
texts with a new focus, so that they learn to interpret stories of conflict in legal terms.  When 
view through this lens, traditional legal pedagogy symbolically mirrors and reinforces an 
epistemology that is vital to the legal system’s legitimacy. 
Id. 
 95. Id. at 99.   
 96. Id. at 100.   
 97. Bix, supra note 5, at 983 (“Legal education is relevant to questions about the autonomy of law, not 
only in the sense that this is the context in which forms of legal reasoning are passed on within the 
profession, but also because the training itself may express the forms of knowledge and decision-making 
that are considered distinctive for law, or at least for one particular legal system.”). 
 98. See, e.g., STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., INTRODUCTION, LAW IN ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL READER, 
1 (2007).  
 99. See, e.g., GREENHOUSE II, supra note 41.   
2013 LITTLE BLACK BOXES 151 
 
 
have been remiss to conflate this with activity forming or negotiating 
informal norms and their enforcement.100   
To illustrate this, we might imagine a children’s playground game.  That 
game may incorporate rules formalized elsewhere—for instance in the 
disciplinary handbook—such as “no hitting.”  But a nexus between that form 
and the playground rule would need to occur in order to properly call this 
“law in action.”  Such a nexus might be the moment of introduction when a 
child introduces or invokes the formal school rules.  Without this, the uptake 
of social norm into informal practice is more properly “law-like”—it 
illustrates the children’s mimesis of rulemaking and enforcement and not 
necessarily law as such.  Whether such behavior fulfills a need that is learned 
or innate is a question beyond the scope of this article.   
The playground illustrates a key distinction between law-like behavior 
and law in action; formalized rules with enforceability.  The informal 
negotiation or negation of rules is ripe for ethnographic investigation and 
tells us about identity, individualism, free will, belonging, community, 
collectivism, opportunism, and so forth.  But these topics are distinct from 
the study of how discrete formal doctrines play out in real-world contexts.101  
A presumption that this distinction is negligible, I contend, has limited the 
reach of legal anthropology by ignoring the specific, integrated roles of 
profession and expertise.   
 The will to look past such experts is, for reasons above, understandable. 
But might the popular entrustment of advocacy to a legal profession—a 
division of labor in some senses—be read ethnographically as expressing its 
own wisdom?  This question requires us to reflect on the nature of 
“profession.”  While sometimes compared to medicine, law’s status as a 
profession is based on something other than erudition and clinical service.  
The process of legal education serves, no doubt, as a rite of passage to 
determine membership in the community of practice and expertise.  But what 
truly defines the “legal profession” is its ongoing self-governance or 
autopoiesis. 102   Bar admission, adherence to the rules of professional 
responsibility, and submission to judges formed by the same processes all 
ensure that the law maintains practical and moral boundaries between itself 
                                                           
 100. See NIEZEN, supra note 18, at 2 (“A basic difference can therefore be drawn between those laws 
that have built into them a formal mechanism of enforcement[] that are supported by the possibility of 
(ideally) behavior-modifying, judicially applied sanctions, and those that rely more exclusively on popular 
opinion, compassion, the ‘politics of shame’, or . . . the cultivation of popular ‘indignation.’”).  
 101. A challenge to this may be found in juries. Some have pointed out the ambivalent view of juries in 
modern tort law.  The adherence to a common practice of general verdicts shields the jury from scrutiny 
and prioritizes the common sense judgment of twelve jurors for the formal logic of common law rules.  
KENNETH ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 12 (3d ed. 2007); see also supra note 11 
and accompanying text.  
 102. GUNTHER TEUBNER, AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 3 (1987).  
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and other fields through self-governance.  This maintenance of an insular 
community with discrete rules of practice and morality comes with a 
language whose mastery is requisite to success. 103   Finding themselves 
suddenly facing a dispute, lay individuals may either attempt to quickly learn 
and deploy that language, or approach those trained or experienced in its 
deployment. 104   For these reasons, the law world looks very different to 
anthropologists and lawyers.   
Thus, the tendency to see “law-like” conduct as “law” has missed a 
significant opportunity.  In an era when abrogation of rules and morality at 
very high levels has been lightly scrutinized and poorly understood, what 
should be anthropology’s role in bridging the disconnect between expert and 
lay knowledge when that gap has permitted gross injustice on a global scale?  
How can it study law in a way that takes seriously its “ethnographically” 
experienced other-worldliness? 105   And above all here, how can it 
communicate with experts in a way that takes seriously the way they do 
business, the way laypeople see them, and the possibilities afforded by a 





                                                           
 103. See GREENHOUSE II, supra note 43.  
 104. American popular culture is rife with examples of people doing this, much to the comedic pleasure 
of wide audiences.  LEGALLY BLONDE (MGM 2001) and MY COUSIN VINNY are but two cinematic 
examples.  These images also have a way of entering our lexicon as clichés, shorthand for the whole 
uncanny experience of bridging an expertise gap from a precarious position despite all odds only to win.  
See LEGALLY BLONDE (MGM 2001); MY COUSIN VINNY (20th Century Fox 1992). 
 105. See NIEZEN, supra note 18, at 1.  Niezen aptly terms this an “ethnography of the unknowable.”  But 
see, e.g., Tejani, supra note 58. This stands opposed to more accepted notions of “law as local 
knowledge.” 
 106. See IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM: CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE AND 
THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD-ECONOMY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (2011).  A breakdown of 
the conceptual boundary between formal legal doctrine (even in action) and “law like” behavior has 
coincided with the permeation of disciplinary boundaries.  This has largely occurred in the form of 
methodological and theoretical borrowing; the use of archives in ethnographic fieldworks is one key 
example.  See JOHN COMAROFF & JEAN COMAROFF, ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION 
18 (1992).  But this change has not razed disciplinary borders.  If anything, it has brought discussions of 
disciplinarity to the front of legal anthropological work.  Such discussion can be important, as it serves a 
goal of transparency and author positioning for scholarly audiences.  Nevertheless, the trend toward this 
interdisciplinary positioning comes with potential costs.  Bringing law and anthropology together by 
conceptual bridge-building surrenders the productive value of colliding the two at their conceptual cores.  
The former enterprise has already been described above.  It is represented in the argument that law can be 
understood through “law like” behavior and entails an ethnographic focus on law’s margins.  This allows 
the researcher to approach a field site not otherwise of obvious ‘value’ to mainstream lawyers and 
describe ways in which it is analogous to the situations in which they more often operate.  This then 
allows them to draw lessons for their own work.  Whether lawyers complete this process is questionable.  
More likely, they stop short because other disciplines and their studies are more direct about their 
message. 
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1. Disciplinary Power 
 
A preliminary step might be to reevaluate the conceptual weight given to 
disciplinary power in legal ethnography.  That term, distinguished from State 
or sovereign power as the exercise of domination in micro-social 
relationships, originated by French social philosopher Michel Foucault and 
has pervaded social science and humanities in Europe and North America 
over the past twenty years.107  Disciplinary power is pessimistic about human 
nature: heavily influenced by Nietzsche, Foucault saw discipline rooted in 
the human being’s individual will to dominate its local contexts while 
serving the legitimation of sovereign power.108  Historical examples of this 
abounded in his time.  French collaboration under Vichy, Colonial repression 
in North Africa, and quotidian military atrocities in South East Asia, were all 
recent or contemporaneous political concerns for the French Nietzscheans.  
In a sense disciplinary power evokes the law jobs.  The law jobs are 
diffuse law and law-like activities in which wide numbers of tribal members 
participate, and upon which the successful governance of Cherokee behavior 
and social reproduction is premised.109 They represent a kind of legitimacy or 
“buy-in” where tribal members collaborated in their own normative 
regulation.  Similarly, disciplinary power and its myriad practical sites serve 
the legitimacy of sovereign power—the basis for State authority.  Beyond 
                                                           
 107. Most Cited Authors of Books in the Humanities, 2007, Times Higher Education (FEB. 10, 2013), 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=405956.  
 108. MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972–
1977 98 (1980) (“Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which 
only functions in the form of a chain.  It is never localised here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never 
appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth.  Power is employed and exercised through a net-like 
organisation.  And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of 
simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power.  They are not only its inert or consenting target; 
they are always also the elements of its articulation.”); see also id. at 105 (“This new type of power, which 
can no longer be formulated in terms of sovereignty, is, I believe, one of the great inventions of bourgeois 
society.  It has been a fundamental instrument in the constitution of industrial capitalism and of the type of 
society that is its accompaniment.  This non-sovereign power, which lies outside the form of sovereignty, 
is disciplinary power.  Impossible to describe in the terminology of the theory of sovereignty from which 
it differs so radically, this disciplinary power ought by rights to have led to the disappearance of the grand 
juridical edifice created by that theory.  But in reality, the theory of sovereignty has continued not only to 
exist as an ideology of right, but also to provide the organising principle of the legal codes of Europe 
acquired in the nineteenth century, beginning with the Napoleonic Code . . . . [T]he theory of sovereignty, 
and the organisation of a legal code centred upon it, have allowed a system of right to be superimposed 
upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures, the element of 
domination inherent in its techniques, and to guarantee to everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the 
State, the exercise of his proper sovereign rights.  The juridical systems—and this applies both to their 
codification and to their theorisation—have enabled sovereignty to be democratised through the 
constitution of a public right articulated upon collective sovereignty, while at the same time this 
democratisation of sovereignty was fundamentally determined by and grounded in mechanisms of 
disciplinary coercion.” ) (emphasis added). 
 109. Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 1373. 
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legitimacy, the two concepts both capture a demand for efficiency supplied 
by legal culture.  If we take as axiomatic law’s goal of regulating human 
behavior (optimal deterrence in some iterations of tort law) then we must 
account for its ability to accomplish this in the lives of the many while only 
directly acting upon relatively few individuals.110  This efficiency requisite 
for law’s success is accomplished precisely through the functioning of “legal 
culture.”  Both law jobs and disciplinary power seem to account for this 
demand and supply of legal culture.       
But morally the two concepts are sharply different.  Llewellyn and 
Hoebel described the Cherokee approach to law and legal institutions in 
order to shed light on the American context around them.   Llewellyn used 
the Cherokee example to support legal realism—the philosophy that law is 
geared to the solution of real problems through pragmatic jurisprudence 
rather than through rote application of rules to facts.111  In this sense, the law 
jobs provided an opportunity to assert that, in its purest contexts (e.g., tribal 
society), law was a pragmatic and aspirational endeavor and as such 
incorporated the practices of a larger swath of the society.112 
In medical anthropology, disciplinary power has inspired ethnographic 
and theoretical writings that bridge the physiological and psychological lives 
of people with the quotidian exercise of State power.113  There, discipline is 
used to question citizen complicity with the State’s exercise of sovereign 
power.  The sovereignty of States cannot function, Foucault wrote, but for 
the everyday, quotidian acts of discipline wherein human beings effectively 
police one another’s behavior and enforce norms. 114   These sites of 
disciplinary power have been highly attractive to legal anthropology:  NGOs 
conducting human rights work in the developing world, immigration clinics 
in metropolitan borderlands, or property conceptions among artists or 
computer programmers.  Studies at these and other sites show us how norms 
become assimilated and enforced by people in the day to day, and thus how 
law achieves its greatest efficiency through the ability to control behavior 
without having to act upon all those within its purview.  This is particularly 
true in new cultural contexts where State authority has not yet been 
formalized.115  
And yet are valuable ethnographic studies of these intriguing sites the 
study of law and its material or are they, rather, studies of the influence of 
                                                           
 110. See, e.g., NIEZEN, supra note 18.  
 111. Ajay Mehrotra, Law and the “Other”:  Karl N. Llewellyn, Cultural Anthropology, and the Legacy 
of the Cheyenne Way, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 741, 743 (2001). 
 112. Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 1373.  
 113. See, e.g., JOAO BIEHL, VITA:  LIFE IN A ZONE OF SOCIAL ABANDONMENT (2005); see also NANCY 
SCHEPER-HUGHES, DEATH WITHOUT WEEPING:  THE VIOLENCE OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN BRAZIL (1992).  
 114. NIEZEN, supra note 18, at 16. 
 115. The early Internet is a prime example of this pre-formalized normative environment.  See, e.g., 
Gabriella Coleman, The Political Agnosticism of Free and Open Source Software and the Inadvertent 
Politics of Contrast, 77 ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 03 (2004). 
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law at informal or pre-formalized sites and their material?  For instance, 
while Geertz writes, “[l]aw doesn’t just mop up, it defines[,]”116 the dualistic 
role of law in mopping up and world making is no longer denied in legal 
scholarship and profession.  But, the “world making” role of law in all 
societies, has at times been cleverly held at bay because its lessons do not 
facilitate solution of specific problems in specifically enforceable ways.  
Law, then, does not just mop up—but it does do that among other things 
when applied to messy social or interpersonal situations.  If so, this is simply 
because we say it can.   
This “provisionality” of clean-up and its legitimation of power 
arrangements seems to be the focus of much legal anthropology.  My 
contention is that neither provisionality nor legitimation should be news to 
legal philosophers.  Of greater insight—both to scholars of law and the 
‘publics’ impacted by their students—are the means by which the materiality 
of law, its rules, procedures, and institutions, escape the gaze of legal 
subjects through occultation.117  One such means, I suggest below, is the 
legal black boxing of culture in the very language of common law rules.      
 
2.  Law as Culture 
 
With its embrace of disciplinary power, legal anthropology saw 
diminished influence upon legal education and jurisprudence; this 
estrangement vexed a discipline once thought to be the most “activist” of the 
social sciences.118  Cognizant of this malaise, recent works have called for a 
reappraisal of the use-value of anthropology to law, and an “invitation” of 
lawyers to embrace the cultural foundations of their discipline and 
profession.119  In furtherance of this, Rosen suggests lawyers should view 
law, not simply in relation to, but as culture.120  
  Echoing Geertz, Rosen writes that law consists of the formal and 
practical creation and negotiation of categories. 121   When this becomes 
difficult, arguments are made about why new sets of facts belong in one or 
another category, or why existing categories must be stretched to 
                                                           
 116. ROSEN, supra note 23, at 8. 
 117. Tejani, supra note 58.  
 118. ROSEN, supra note 23, at 200. 
 119. Id.; see GREENHOUSE I, supra note 17. 
 120. ROSEN, supra note 23, at 200.  
 121. Id.  This insight is almost as old as anthropology.  “Anthropologists have long been aware of a 
basic human capacity to construct categories that bring together patterns of belonging and behavior.  In 
The Savage Mind, Claude Lévi-Strauss draws upon a wide range of nineteenth-century ethnological 
material . . . to illustrate social-conceptual categories connected to emblematic forms of behavior . . . .”  
NIEZEN, supra note 18, at 15.  
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accommodate new factual variations.122  Not unlike the lurking structural 
anthropology of Levi-Strauss, Rosen’s account enables analogy of law to the 
very workings of cognition through language. These, we are told, filter the 
mind’s eye as it gazes out upon the world.123 
But the characterization of law as culture contains a premise I wish to 
problematize here.  This is the notion that law and culture act with the same, 
or similar, relative torque upon what human beings take for granted as 
“Real.”  Reality, the proposition goes, is socially constructed. 124   Its 
construction consists of fundamental building blocks of perception and 
understanding:  categories by some accounts, words and symbols by others.  
Use of these categories, words, or symbols, is everything.  Created and 
exchanged among individuals, these become not only the common 
denominator of community, but, as learned in Geertz’ account, requisite to 
belonging in it.125  Thus, one’s status in a community is not only dependent 
upon internal point-to-point relationships, but also upon one’s relationship to 
the “Reality” in which that community lives and operates. 
 
V.  LEGAL “BLACK BOXES”:  TORT LAW AND THE PROVISIONAL AUTONOMY 
OF CULTURE 
 
The common law is self-reflexive of its role in reproducing social 
stability through cultural integration.  In it, Anglo-American jurists have 
constructed doctrinal regions where cultural questions are cordoned off to be 
decided ad hoc as questions of “fact” in discrete cases and contexts. 126  
Borrowing from Bruno Latour’s seminal work in science and technology 
studies, I wish to consider these doctrinal zones legal black boxes.127  For 
Latour, “black boxing” entailed the deferral of questions about a given 
system unit’s function when the objective was to understand the system as a 
                                                           
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Social constructivism has modern origins in the sociology of Emile Durkheim characterized post-
modern social science and reached an apogee with social studies of virtual reality.  See EMILE DURKHEIM, 
THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (1895); PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966);  SHERRY TURKLE, 
LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET (1995).    
 125. Supra note 77.   
 126. I specify “Anglo-american” here because it remains to be conjectured whether this development is 
so ubiquitous in other contexts.  It may well be; however, I suspect that its emergence is related to the 
development of modern nations and nationalisms that sought legitimacy by transcending cultural 
particularisms of the previous age.  In forthcoming work, I will explore the relationship of legal black 
boxing of culture to the rise of modern nation-states.     
 127. BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION:  HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS THROUGH 
SOCIETY (1987).  Myriad spaces in the formal law are carved out and protected to permit judges and juries 
to defer certain questions to the realms of community, nation, industry—all of which are placeholders for 
culture.  While this does not hermetically seal law from culture, it does practically separate the two in 
ways highly consequential to both practitioners and clients.     
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whole. 128   While on one hand such designated zones illustrate the wide 
imbrication of law and culture (e.g. all law is immanently language), they 
also indicate a self-conscious effort to separate cultural concerns from legal 
ones for the purpose of structuring decision-making, advocacy, and public 
behavior.  These areas attest to law’s provisional autonomy, and the 
perennial effort that must go into maintaining this.   In this way, legal black 
boxes are the site at which law fabricates its own autonomy and where 
knowledge of such fabrication is occulted–hidden behind expert knowledge 
and practice.  
The law of torts illustrates this process well.129  There, common law rules 
have been developed, enshrined in judicial opinions, and codified into the 
various Restatements on Law by the American Law Institute.  Examining 
discrete causes of action in torts and their constituent “elements,” one sees in 
them a pattern of deferring cultural questions to non-legal authority (e.g. jury 
or judge as fact-finder).  In the law of torts, cultural questions become 
variables in the analysis permitted by the rule, but values ascribed to those 
variables are left provisional.  This treatment permits law to serve its overtly 
normative function while separating description from norm. 
 
A. Description and Norm 
 
The dichotomy between description and norm has preoccupied both law 
and legal anthropology.130  With interpretive anthropology came a realization 
that divisions between description and norm—fact and law for Geertz—were 
culturally relative.131  Later, the writing process itself came to be considered 
a descriptive endeavor as no researcher was an unfiltered lens through which 
culture was simply magnified.132  This focus upon description was welcomed 
after early ethnographic work had been used in the ordering and regulation of 
native peoples by colonial regimes.133 Whereas description had once been 
                                                           
 128. Id. 
 129. Bix, supra note 5, at 985 (“The argument of the neo-formalists is that certain areas of doctrine 
(e.g. tort law) have an essence, which current practices roughly express, but the law should be reformed to 
express that essence more fully.”) (emphasis added).   
 130. See, e.g., Riles, supra note 23, at 643–44.  Some have cogently sought to establish the contingency 
of this dichotomy across cultural contexts.  One early illustration might be the more functionalist accounts 
of Malinowski where focus upon proximate documentation of norms distinguished itself from the 
distanced generalizing process of armchair ethnology.  In those days, tribal communities were approached 
as human laboratories and the field researcher viewed himself as scientist.  He saw his work of 
documenting native practices, beliefs, and symbolism not as description but as inscription—writing in text 
what he observed in front of him.  Riles, supra note 23, at 603–04.  
 131. Geertz II, supra note 68. 
 132. JAMES CLIFFORD & GEORGE MARCUS, WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF 
ETHNOGRAPHY (1986).  
 133. Id. at 9–10. 
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viewed as objective observation of people in their context, it was now one 
researcher’s experience with a circumscribed group that may or may not have 
been generalizable to the entire society. 134   
This disclaimer makes anthropology conceptually more interesting and 
presents a safe space for the reflexive description of disappearing cultures, or 
metropolitan subcultures.  It serves an archival function, still ripe since the 
time of Lévi-Strauss, 135  but it also serves the comparativist priority by 
providing so-called raw material for comparison across cultural boundaries, 
and thus, the mapping of those boundaries themselves. 
 Despite these virtues of avoiding normative argument, legal 
anthropology might reevaluate potential for its own normative judgments 
about change in ethnographic communities (particularly as those get closer to 
home), and the possibility that lawmakers in their informants’ communities 
will take up ethnographic accounts in regulating local behavior.136  Many will 
cringe at this: first, because ethnographers prefer not to consider their 
accounts as “empirical output,” and second because such accounts have 
generally and purposely removed themselves from temporality.  While law 
embraces its temporal position through arguments about change, legal 
anthropology has long distanced itself from time through snapshots of legal 
culture in the perennial “ethnographic present.”137  This reservation misses 
two key things.  First, as others have said, descriptive accounts are built upon 
frameworks of normative thinking.138  Second, normative arguments, even if 
provisionally autonomous, make descriptive suppositions about the “way the 
world works.”139   
The mutuality of description and norm in law is nearly inverse to that in 
anthropology. Whereas in anthropology normative considerations lurk deep 
in the background of even reflexive projects, in law, descriptive propositions 
remain obscured.140  Proponents of a renewed role for legal anthropology 
have long noted the myriad background cultural assumptions underpinning 
legal arguments and decisions.141  Those discussions do not reflect heavily on 
                                                           
 134. Id. at 10 (“Cultures do not hold still for their portraits.  Attemtps to make them do so always 
involve simplification and exclusion, selection of a temporal focus, the construction of a particular self-
other relationship, and the imposition or negotiation of a power relationship.”). 
 135. Lévi-Strauss, supra note 66.  
 136. ASAD, supra note 65.   
 137. E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, ANTHROPOLOGY:  THE STUDY OF MAN 32 (1972) (“Cultures are constantly 
changing and modifying.  Yet in anthropology we investigate a society on a field trip of greater or less 
duration, after which we write up a monograph describing its culture.  In so doing, we fix for the moment 
those main lines of characteristic behavior that have been perceived and noted as though they were all 
taking place at any given moment.”).  
 138. Riles, supra note 23, at 644.  
 139. Id.  
 140. See supra note 5, at 762 (“[Langdell] said that the principles oflaw could be inferred from judicial 
opinions, so that the relevant training for students of the law was in reading and comparing opinions and 
the relevant knowledge was the knowledge of what those opinions contained.”). 
 141. See ROSEN, supra note 23; see also DAVID ENGLE & MICHAEL MCCANN, FAULT LINES:  TORT 
LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 1–20 (2009).   
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questions of how the world works and rather serve to forestall any such 
reflection. When legal anthropology presents the problem of cultural 
assumptions in law then, it usually does so with two implicit messages: first, 
that realization of this brings added value to lawyers, and second, that 
capacity to deliver such value grants the subfield its best entry into academic 
law. 
These two notions, I am suggesting, may be overly optimistic.  
Awareness of the cultural assumptions that enter core legal discussions does 
not necessarily add value to the work of lawyers because it is insight with 
which they are already familiar.  That is to say, the very work of lawyers—
both their reason for being and their formal and informal training—is meant 
to set aside cultural reflection.  This has been observed at several sites:  
Mertz’ study of the law school environment is one example, while Rosen’s 
discussion of the oracular quality of civil juries is another.142  Engel and 
McCann, meanwhile, have noted the great latitude afforded judges on 
deciding cultural questions as a “matter of law” in several areas of tort law.143 
 
B. Tort Law’s Little Black Boxes 
 
To better understand such deference, it is necessary to consider how 
formal law treats its contextual cultural environment.  This consideration is 
interested not in the way law ramifies in its social context, but in the way 
social context is processed in legal concepts.  For this purpose I propose a 
brief but closer reading of Anglo-American tort law.  There, legal doctrine is 
not a panacea for understanding law’s occultation, but it is one example 
where ethnographic and ethnological study of law benefits from observation 
of the sovereign power behind it.  In this case, black boxes in tort law 
illustrate how the sovereign authority of institutional rules attempts to 
prescribe the relationship they shall have with their cultural environment. 
 
1. Strict Liability 
 
The law of torts may be divided into two basic regimes–strict liability 
and fault liability—imposed through specific causes of action developed 
                                                           
 142. See Mertz, supra note 100; ROSEN, supra note 23, at 147; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 101, at 
6–7 (“There are two different kinds of fact-finding that juries perform. One is making ‘pure’ findings of 
fact.  This requires answering empirical questions about the world, past, present, or future: did the 
defendant strike the plaintiff, how long had the banana peel been lying on the supermarket aisle before the 
plaintiff slipped on it . . . .  I do not mean to minimize how difficult it sometimes is to answer merely 
empirical questions.  Predicting how much an injured person will suffer from her injury twenty years from 
now is a pure empirical question, but that does not make it any easier to answer.”). 
 143. ENGEL & MCCANN, supra note 141.  
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under common law. Within each of these, deference on matters of culture 
appears across the entire spectrum of liability theories.  
To begin, strict liability was created, and then expanded to cover few 
very specific kinds of harm resulting from activity that in essence is 
considered “abnormally dangerous.” 144   This concept has changed in its 
accounting for change over time, and its legitimacy and efficiency are 
premised not only on corrective justice and deterrence but on changes in 
these values as societies evolve.  Hence, the First Restatement imposes strict 
liability for “ultrahazardous activity,” defining it in terms of the risk of 
serious harm “not eliminated by exercise of utmost care” and by the lack of 
commonality of the conduct.145  This definition allowed that even highly 
dangerous activity could become more or less common in time and place.146  
In the Second Restatement, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) switched to 
labelling this conduct “abnormally dangerous” and added a list of six factors 
in applying the standard.147  Most significant  was inclusion of factors of 
appropriateness to place and social utility.148  The addition of these factors 
illustrates the derivative operation of strict liability law vis-à-vis culture; 
factors adjusting for cultural change in the law would themselves change 
subject to new priorities.  In this case, both utility and place index an added 
emphasis on the particular industrial use of land and conduct in question and 
their value to the ambient society.149  It is important to note that such rules of 
contextual valuation support cultural mythologies that underpin governance 
more generally.  For example, they have often celebrated environmental 
purity as a requisite for domestic family life.150 
Finally, the Third Restatement dropped the six factor test and returned to 
the earlier, simplified rule reinstating “abnormally dangerous” and defining it 
in terms of foreseeability, risk despite reasonable care, and commonality of 
the conduct.151   Remaining behind this rule today is a flexibility toward 
cultural shifts in conduct, and the background assumption that greater 
                                                           
 144. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Rylands v. Fletcher:  Tort Law’s Conscience, in TORTS STORIES 207 
(Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).   
 145. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 (1938). 
 146. Context would already be taken for granted as English speaking and subject to Common Law “rule 
of law.”  
 147. Arlington Forest Assocs. v. Exxon Corp., 774 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D. Va. 1991); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). 
 148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. j–h (1977). 
 149. See id.   
 150. Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138, 140 (Md. 1969) (“The fifth and perhaps most crucial factor 
under the Institute’s guidelines as applied to this case is the appropriateness of the activity in the particular 
place where it is being carried on.  No one would deny that gasoline stations as a rule do not present any 
particular danger to the community.  However, when the operation of such activity involves the placing of 
a large tank adjacent to a well from which a family must draw its water for drinking, bathing and laundry, 
at least that aspect of the activity is inappropriate to the locale, even when equated to the value of the 
activity.”) 
 151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 (2010).  
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incidence of that conduct may serve to limit liability for harm it creates.152  
The goal here, like most of tort law, is not to compensate for all wrongs 
created, but to compensate for wrongs which represent a departure from 
accepted cultural practices.153  Those practices are themselves not specified; 
and yet, the rules of strict liability have been rearticulated by the ALI with 
greater frequency—and seemingly greater urgency—than most other areas of 
tort law.154  Likely, the gravity of liability without fault in a social context 
that prides (or defines) itself on due process necessitates greater fealty toward 
community values out of which law is said to derive.  Here, overt deference 
to culture prevails especially when the potential for substantive injustice 
through liability without fault is great.  In such cases, one might say, the law 
“punts” to culture.  
In difficult cases, these cultural questions are tried to a jury.  Civil juries 
are permitted to address questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact 
only after a long arduous process of pre-trial and trial advocacy.155  By the 
time a question, or questions, reach the jury, one or both sides has failed to 
prevail on motions to dismiss, summary judgment, or directed verdicts.156  
The judge cannot, “as a matter of law,” say that certain conduct was, for 
instance, “unreasonable” or departed from “professional standards.” At this, 
its highest level of difficulty, the law defers to a jury of twelve picked “at 
random” for putative cross-sectional representativity of local culture.157  The 
jury, in its culturally monadic function, operates in Rosen’s words as an 
“oracle” to which the society turns for almost mystical guidance on a 
difficult question.158 
 
2. Fault Liability 
 
Beyond narrow strict liability rules, tort law recognizes fault liability for 
wrongs committed both intentionally and negligently.  Considering 
intentional torts alone, one might expect to find little room internally for 
cultural questions and, as a result, little need to defer those questions beyond 
                                                           
 152. See id. § 20, cmt. j (2010). 
 153. ABRAHAM, supra note 101, at 19 (“At best, the desirability of providing compensation will be a 
factor that, when linked with others, makes it more likely that there will be tort liability for a particular 
category of conduct.  And even on that view, providing compensation under certain circumstances rather 
than in general is what is really going on when tort liability is imposed.”). 
 154. See generally supra notes 145, 147, and 151.  Each of the three Restatement of Torts offers a 
different definition of actvitities so dangerous they are subject to strict liability. 
 155. ABRAHAM, supra note 101, at 5.  
 156. Id. 
 157. See, e.g., Catherine Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justificiation for Jury 
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2386–87 (1990). 
 158. ROSEN, supra note 23, at 83–84, 147–48.  
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doctrinal articulation.  After all, to consider whether someone was wronged 
intentionally is, at first blush, a simple inquiry into the nexus between act, 
intent, and result.  The first and third of these components are questions of 
cause and effect; the second is a question of mental state that often poses no 
significant factual question because it is read in terms of external 
manifestation of intent to act rather than intent to harm.159  And indeed, for 
harms to the person in “single-intent” jurisdictions the actor need only have 
intended physical contact making the intent analysis very simple and 
rendering a claim such as battery nearly a strict liability type concern.160  
 
a. Intentional Harms 
 
But, as torts scholars point out, the question of intent has long been an 
enigma for jurists.161  An actor’s thoughts can never be known with certainty, 
and this becomes even more true in diachronic perspective.  Some explain 
that intent is at best a subjective question based on objective evidence: what 
was this person more likely than not thinking given the appearance of the 
evidence to “average reasonable people.”162  Then, again, the appearance of 
evidence to the average reasonable person becomes a question for the jury if 
the judge believes that reasonable minds could differ on the topic. At this 
stage, the question is black boxed with the wisdom of lay culture deferred to 
in the resulting answer.   
Other than “objective” indicia of intent in the harms to the person, the 
law defers to the “oracular” role of culture when protecting other more 
ephemeral rights.  In particular, nuisance, reputational and dignitary harms, 
and invasions of privacy all have built into their doctrines discrete black 
boxes where final disposition can rely heavily on local cultural questions.  In 
nuisance law, such deference is identifiable in the requirements of 
significance and unreasonableness in the invasion of another’s use and 
enjoyment of land.163  Under Restatement §821F nuisance allows liability “. . 
. only to those to whom it causes significant harm, of a kind that would be 
suffered by a normal person in the community or by property in normal 
condition and used for a normal purpose.”164  Under §822, “One is subject to 
liability for a private nuisance if . . . his conduct is a legal cause of an 
invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and 
the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable. 
                                                           
 159. Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 403 (1891).  
 160. Joseph H. King, The Tort’s Restatement’s Inchoate Definition of Intent For Battery, and 
Reflections on the Province of Restatements, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 623, 626 (2011).  
 161. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 101, at 2, 23–26; see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 24 (2000).  
 162. See ABRAHAM, supra note 101, at 23–26 
 163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1979). 
 164. Id. § 822. 
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“Unreasonable” in this rule has come to be analyzed using a multi-factor 
balancing test that weighs gravity of the harm against utility of the 
conduct.165 While arguably any balancing test opens up analysis to increased 
case-by-case discretion and non-doctrinal reasoning, this one is particularly 
designed to defer assessment of nuisance to local culture.  Public policy 
justification for this move is strong: in conflicts over land use “place” matters 
and local custom over time is the best marker of that.166  Hard, fast rules on 
reasonable use designed by remote judges would burden the kind of 
dynamism English and American capitalist economies traditionally needed to 
support constant growth.  Not unlike the flexibility built into strict liability 
law over time, nuisance exhibits the same change-friendly derivative 167 
qualities through judicious deferral to cultural considerations rooted in 
“place.” 
Integration of cultural black boxes in dignitary and reputational harms is 
nearly too obvious to mention and has been alluded to more frequently.  In 
the case of defamation, this is most apparent in the analysis of “defamatory 
matter.” 168   There the plaintiff must show that the language used in a 
statement would have a tendency to harm her reputation among a significant 
and respectable minority of the community.169  A minority rule limits this 
“community” definition to “right thinking people.”170  Lyrissa Lidsky has 
argued that these definitions afford significant flexibility to judges both for 
arriving at a final outcome on defamation, as well as the subsidiary question 
of which “subcultures” will be legitimized in the eyes of the law.171    
Defamatory matter illustrates a fascinating quality of jurisprudence—
particularly in relation to the work of anthropology.  It raises the question of 
whether law at this site is, or should be, concerned with normative values or 
                                                           
 165. Id. § 826. 
 166. See, e.g., Setha M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zuniga, Locating Culture, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF 
SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE 1–48 (Setha M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zuniga eds., 2003).  
 167. I use derivative in its mathematical sense accounting for changes in change over time.  
 168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (“A communication is defamatory if it tends so to 
harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons 
from associating or dealing with him.”). 
 169. Id.; see also Lyrissa Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 7 (1996) (“[C]ourts rarely resort to polls, surveys or even witness testimony to determine the 
values held by the community segment but instead rely on their own personal knowledge and common 
sense.”). 
 170. See, e.g., Loder v. Nied, 89 A.D.3d 1197, 1198–99 (explaining that a statement is defamatory if it 
“tends to expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion 
of him [or her] in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him [or her] of their friendly 
intercourse in society”). 
 171. See Lidsky, supra note 169, at 8 (“The intuitive nature of this inquiry raises the question of whether 
and to what extent courts should consider sub community values . . . .”). 
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description. 172   If the answer is description, then this demands we use 
community values embedded in the “defamatory matter” analysis to 
faithfully capture the way local cultures classify people as good and bad.  If 
we believe law should behave normatively in this context, the analysis allows 
judges to shape community values by sanctioning local views they determine 
to be socially valid.  In practice, the latter occurs either through the minority 
rule of “right thinking persons” or through the majority rule’s selectivity in 
recognizing groups that are “substantial” or “respectable.”173  
Finally, invasion of privacy torts are identifiably similar in at least one 
respect: their rules—in most jurisdictions, four separate actions all directed at 
the protection of individual right to solitude or control over image—have 
within them a conspicuous objective element that measures individual harm 
against community norms.  Thus,  intrusion on seclusion, public disclosure, 
and false light all require that the harmful invasion must be “highly 
offensive” to the average reasonable person.174  This is a critical element of 
the privacy theories because, in addition to the subjective experience of such 
invasions, the plaintiff must show an objective wrong—that most others in 
his community would be not only disturbed, but “highly” disturbed by the 
conduct.175  This aspect of the rule requires a trial judge to first consider 
whether reasonable jurors could disagree on this question, and then the jurors 
themselves to reflect upon the degree of offense in a way inscrutable to the 
legal process that has led to that point.176   
Between nuisance, defamation, and invasions of privacy, analysis for 
liability centers upon the classification of conduct as harmful. Through the 
concepts of “substantial and unreasonable,” “defamatory matter,” and 
“highly offensive,” that classification often becomes a cultural consideration 
inscribed into, and enshrined in, formal rules. 
 
b. Negligent Harms 
 
Finally, in negligence, tort law is interested neither in the determination 
of intent, nor in the classification of intentional conduct as harmful, but in the 
determination of breach—nonconformity with a standard of care. 177  
Standard of care in these instances is defined by one of only a few principles, 
                                                           
 172. See id. at 9 (showing that this clearly accesses the normative-descriptive tension common to Tort 
Law, “the underlying question is whether the defamatoriness inquiry should focus on actual community 
values and prejudices or whether, as it currently does, the inquiry should impose normative restrictions on 
what values it will recognize”). 
 173. Id. at 9, 21; see also DOBBS, supra note 161, at 1127–28.  
 174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D(a), 652E (1977). 
 175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B cmt. d, 652D cmt. c, 652E  cmt. c. (1977)  
 176. See, e.g., Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 60 F. Supp. 2d 298, 303 (D. Del. 1999) (“. . .  a 
determination of whether a particular intrusion is ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’ is often left to 
the consideration of a jury . . .”).  
 177. See ABRAHAM, supra note 101, at 51.  
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each of which requires the positioning of the actor in his or her 
“community.”178  For most cases, this is the fictional community of average 
“reasonable men,” and the law places final determination on this in the hands 
of jurors whose reasoning is typically be shielded from review.179  In others it 
may be an industrial or professional peer group.  In some instances, this may 
involve twelve lay persons deciding highly technical issues such as whether 
medical or engineering standards were followed.  Deference to lay wisdom in 
the form of negligence law’s reliance upon the “reasonable person” is simply 
a final example here of the cultural black boxes constructed under tort law.    
Through strict liability, and intentional and negligent theories of fault 
liability, black boxes maintain deference to cultural questions in a very 
precise, compartmentalized fashion.  They ensure not that the law will have a 
normative grip on ambient society, but that difficult questions the law cannot 
resolve will be punted back to the more dynamic and derivatively functional 
realm of culture.  As I am suggesting, even when decided by judges, these 
questions are rhetorically differentiated in a manner that reflects law’s 
deliberate management of its own autonomy. While these observations alone 
offer some insight, the key question is how legal anthropology should 
approach and incorporate them given the relatively wide gulf between the 
disciplines. 
 
VI.  PATHWAYS TO RAPPORT 
 
Law’s deference to culture at the very heart of its rule statements—
evident at least at the site of Anglo-American tort law—is self-reflexive. This 
is because, as suggested above, law too far removed from local culture lacks 
the capacity  to change with change, that culture so ingeniously possesses.  
The little black boxes apparent in the examples above are not accidents 
inscribed into doctrine in need of further explanation; they are sites at which 
law has deliberately deferred to the wisdom of the “laity” and asked not for 
                                                           
 178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1965).  The relevant portion states: 
The chief advantage of this standard of the reasonable man is that it enables the triers of fact 
who are to decide whether the actor’s conduct is such as to subject him to liability for 
negligence, to look to a community standard rather than an individual one, and at the same 
time to express their judgment of what that standard is in terms of the conduct of a human 
being. The standard provides sufficient flexibility, and leeway, to permit due allowance to 
be made for such differences between individuals as the law permits to be taken into 
account, and for all of the particular circumstances of the case which may reasonably affect 
the conduct required, and at the same time affords a formula by which, so far as possible, a 
uniform standard may be maintained. 
Id.  
 179. Gender bias in this codified formulation is a rich topic best left to another discussion.  
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an explanation of that wisdom.180  Viewed in this light, the predominant 
explanatory offering of legal anthropology to academic law—be it reparatory 
or critical—is often moot.  Or, it might be said, it fulfills a demand where 
one may not exist.   
It is not simply that formal Western law recognizes in ways described 
above the improvised wisdom of everyday life and limitations of its 
formalism.  It is that the law, its practitioners, teachers, philosophers, and 
authors, all exert considerable albeit unspoken effort to separate the cultural 
considerations from the formal rules.  This effort represents perhaps the 
greatest expenditure of human capital in legal education.   Law’s purpose, in 
short, is not to explain reality but to shape it—hence increasing reliance upon 
the neighboring disciplines.181  Given this, legal anthropological appeals for 
greater attention and impact in law must be very specific about the 
explanatory offerings they present and be cognizant of the precise points of 
contact between law and culture prescribed by the former through its 
ultimately sovereign authority.  Assuming the desirability of a legal 
anthropology influential upon law, a well-tailored message is now more 
necessary than ever.                                         
That message, I am suggesting, ought not to take the form of “law as 
culture.”  Legal anthropology may be interested in law ‘wherever it lies,’ and 
law may be ‘practiced’ by a wide variety of actors, but these do not make law 
synonymous with, or a subset of, culture.  Continuing to assert otherwise 
does not interpellate a greater law audience, and understanding this requires 
understanding law’s reason for existence and the specific tactics of its 
practitioners.  Reluctance toward this understanding in anthropology has 
been surprising given the usual preference for insider perspectives in most 
other corners of the discipline.   
Such difficulty stems from the duality of law as both a discipline (or 
epistemic community) and a profession (or practice).182  In arguing for a 
greater rapport of legal anthropology through the surrendering of a “law as 
culture” approach, this article has largely ignored this duality, and a proper 
distinction between them is better left to another discussion.  Anthropology 
                                                           
 180. “Social host” rules are a good example of this.  In Kelly v. Gwinnell, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court wrote:  
This [c]ourt senses that there may be a substantial change occurring in social attitudes and 
customs concerning drinking, whether at home or in taverns.  We believe that this change 
may be taking place right now in New Jersey and perhaps elsewhere.  It is the upheaval of 
prior norms by a society that has finally recognized that it must change its habits and do 
whatever is required, whether it means but a small change or a significant one, in order to 
stop the senseless loss inflicted by drunken drivers.  We did not cause that movement, but 
we believe this decision is in step with it. 
Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1229 (N.J. 1984).   
 181. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 5, at 771 (“[N]othing in a conventional legal education—nothing 
gleaned from a close reading of judicial opinions, statutes and rules—equips a person to notice, let alone 
to measure, explain, temper, and adjust to, and increase in the demand for judicial services.”).  
 182. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 10. 
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too is both an epistemology and practice; it is based on a belief that 
experience is the most faithful source of knowledge and that fieldwork is 
most efficient in attaining this in geographically remote situations. 183  
However, in both epistemology and in practice, the priorities of goal-
oriented, formal reasoning make ongoing use of the little black boxes in legal 
doctrine described above.  To make a relevant and utile explanatory offering 
to law in both of these contexts, legal anthropology might attend to—even if 
only with provisional fealty toward the insider approach—the rigorous 
formalism that characterizes Western law and neutralizes the benefit of “law 
as culture.”184                            
To achieve this, several ruptures are necessary.  First, the subfield might 
further break from its “primitivist” past to develop new tools for 
understanding the complexity of law in the current world system.  Up to this 
point few efforts have managed to disaggregate the anthropological object 
known as “law.”  Classic legal anthropology continues to influence present 
day conversations and studies aimed to understand Western legal concepts 
and processes largely by studying non-Western norms and dispute resolution 
systems. 185   Those works tended to suppose the “primitivism” of non-
Western native systems and described them  from the outside first through 
armchair ethnology and later through ethnographic fieldwork. 186   As the 
                                                           
 183. See JAMES DONOVAN, LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY:  AN INTRODUCTION, XIII (2008) (“The sea change 
represented by Malinowski for anthropology generally not only legal anthropology was his long fieldwork 
among the Trobriand Islanders, conducted in the native language, for primarily scientific purposes.  The 
systematic and meticulous record of his research was qualitatively superior to the travel logs and 
missionary reports that to that point had provided most of the information available to theorists working 
from their overstuffed armchairs . . . .”).  
 184. See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 12–13:  
Some critics will be anxious to say at this point that our project is not only partial in these 
various ways but wrong, that we will misunderstand legal process if we pay special attention 
to lawyers' doctrinal arguments about what the law is. They say these arguments obscure—
perhaps they aim to obscure—the important social function of law as ideological 
phenomenon demands, these critics say, a more scientific or sociological or historical 
approach that pays no or little attention to jurisprudential puzzles over the correct 
characterization of legal argument . . . .  This objection fails by its own standards. It asks for 
social realism, but the kind of theory it recommends is unable to provide it. Of course law is 
a social phenomenon. But, its complexity, function, and consequence all depend on one 
special feature of its structure. Legal practice, unlike many other social phenomena, is 
argumentative . . . .  This crucial argumentative aspect of legal practice can be studied in 
two ways or from two points of view. One is the external point of view of the sociologist or 
historian, who asks why certain patterns of legal argument develop in some periods or 
circumstances rather than in others, for example. The other is the internal point of view of 
those who make the laims...they want theoeries not about how history and economics have 
shaped their consciousnessbut about the place of these disciplines in argument about what 
the law requires them to do or have . . . .  Both perspectives on law, the external and the 
internal, are essential, and each must embrace or take account of the other.   
 185. See supra note 32. 
 186. See Hoebel, supra note 32, at 62, 66 (describing generally the evolutionism in Morgan, Maine and 
others). 
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interpretivist approach came to dominate ethnography, it took the insider 
perspective on norms and dispute resolution defining this in terms of legal 
subjects generally—not only law makers and law enforcers.187  This approach 
seemed suitable in the tribal societies of North Africa, Indonesia, or the 
South Pacific, where members of legal communities participate in the 
operation and structure of their own governing systems. In short, law could 
best be understood from the native’s point of view  in studies where its 
arbiters (elders, tribal councils, shamans) are its subjects (villagers, 
tribesmen) and imperialism in its various forms is considered—if at all—an 
externality.188   
 A similar approach has been transposed onto studies of Western, modern 
law through the advent of disciplinary power as a conceptual tool.189  This 
tool has maintained dominance because it opens up the social study of law to 
increasingly obscure, subtle, and sometimes ingenious sites of fieldwork or 
historiography.190  Nevertheless, as I am suggesting, the predominance of 
disciplinary power in legal anthropology has attenuated the voice of the 
subfield for at least two basic reasons.  First, the persistence of legal 
anthropology’s genealogy in “primitive law” may hinder creativity in 
approaching modern day, complex legal systems.  Despite the relative 
eclecticism of the subfield and its studies, the one feature common to most 
legal anthropologies becomes their emergence from the history of legal 
anthropology.  The tautology of this characterization suggests stagnation in a 
field trained upon a fast changing and highly complex area of the social 
world.  This entails acknowledging the autonomy of formal law in the West 
in a way that distinguishes it considerably from earlier norms and dispute 
resolutions observed in early legal anthropology.  Second, this genealogy 
retains influence even as the studies of which it consists have been 
discredited, the societies it described since re-characterized, and those same 
societies transformed by economic globalization.  In short, “primitive” law 
no longer exists, if ever it did.  The failure to account for and describe that 
which replaces it in the world system has been a hindrance to the relevance 
of legal anthropology in academic law.     
                                                           
 187. See, e.g., Geertz, supra note 68, at 182. 
 188. See, e.g., Vincent Pecora, The Limits of Local Knowledge, in THE NEW HISTORICISM 259 (H. Aram 
Veeser ed.) (1989) (“Geertz’s professed belief in a ‘civil, temperate, unheroic, politics’ would be 
unexceptionable , were it not prone at the same time to narrativize such qualities through the maturing of 
‘naïve’ nations-in-transition into Western-style parliamentary democracies; because of his desire to 
penetrate, like Max Weber, what the social actors ‘thought they were up to,’  the fact that pro-Western 
‘civil’ and ‘temperate’ politics could be imposed from ‘outside’ is never really considered to be a 
possibility.”). 
 189. FOUCAULT, supra note 108.  
 190. See, e.g., Dominic Boyer, The Medium of Foucault in Anthropology, 58 THE MINNESOTA REVIEW 
265, 265 (2003) (“Foucault's pervasiveness is largely unparalleled in anthropology, almost to the point 
that, like oxygen, one takes his ethereal yet nourishing presence in everyday disciplinary life almost for 
granted.”). 
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A second rupture should be envisaged at the site of social construction or 
interpretation.  While it will remain true that legal norms and concepts such 
as “fact,” “guilt,” or “justice” ramify differently as local knowledge in local 
settings, this insight confers little benefit upon teachers, students, and 
practitioners of formal law.  The reason for this, identified above in specific 
doctrines of tort law, is that spaces for local meaning themselves become 
formalized in what I call “legal black boxes” of culture.  These spaces serve a 
twofold function:  (1) maintaining the legitimacy of sovereign power in its 
accommodation of difference, and (2) permitting standardization of rules and 
their wider application by legal experts in discrete circumstances.  If this dual 
process requires expertise in order to operate, it has no problem generating a 
vast corps of experts in law schools across North America, England, and 
Europe.  Indeed, the legal education experience prepares students for 
precisely this clinical application of law.191  The doctrine learned, therefore, 
is inscribed at one level of generality higher than most cultural considerations 
in order to allow their subsequent particularized application to specific fact 
patterns. 
This means that the social constructed-ness of legal meaning is already 
built into modern doctrinal law.  Attention to it, as much legal ethnography 
of late aims to create, is less productive than it once was.  Today, lawyers 
know tacitly or openly that they are engaged in mythologies and fictions.192   
Signaling this does little to alter the way that lawyers, jurists, and judges give 
meaning to people’s problems in ways that often feel like resolution. If this 
observation is significant it is only because, at the end of the day, 
contingency of the “Real,” and acknowledgement thereof, does not resolve 
what people experience as practical, material problems.  Law, in other words, 
is a contingent social institution that acts in and upon a contingent social 
field, but it is rarely experienced as such when human bodies and lives are at 
stake. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Taking these suggestions seriously, legal ethnography could reorient its 
gaze.  But, if privileging disciplinary power has led field research away from 
                                                           
 191. See Mertz, supra note 101; see also Bix, supra note 5, at 983.  In relevant part, Bix stated: 
Legal education is relevant to questions about the autonomy of law, not only in the sense 
that this is the context in which forms of legal reasoning are passed on within the profession, 
but also because the training itself may express the forms of knowledge and decision-
making that are considered distinctive for law, or at least for one particular legal system. 
Id.  
 192. See, e.g., Eben Moglen, Legal Fictions and Common Law Legal Theory, 10 TEL-AVIV UNIV. STUD. 
IN LAW 35 (1991). 
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institutions, spaces, and inscriptions of formal law, the solution might not be 
a complete return to studies of sovereign power at locations such as the 
legislature, courthouse, law library, or State Bar.193  Yet these sites should 
serve as navigational pylons reminding the researcher that while law ramifies 
in local settings, it continues to emanate from, and be constrained by, 
sovereign authority in these locations.  To ignore this is to make a tactical 
error with political consequences; it is to suggest speciously that law is 
everywhere.  While this might have been true in tribal communities (which 
anthropology itself undermined), it proved false once those communities 
came under colonial rule and once metropolitan sovereign authority 
consolidated into nation-states.  Under our modern regimes of law in global 
governance, the denial of persistent—albeit occulted—sovereign power has 
permitted large scale episodes of greed, corruption, violence, and procedural 
injustice.  One solution, I hold, is to reground ethnographic fieldwork in legal 
institutions, doctrine, and enforcement to focus upon the provisionality of 
law’s autonomy.  If it is not equivalent to culture, and if culture is inscribed 
into its rules and excised via legal black boxes, then ethnographic approaches 
might explain how the labor-intensive process of this separation succeeds at 
the precise sites where sovereign power meets disciplinary power.         
Law is not synonymous with culture; it still remains deeply rooted in 
governance, institutions, and sovereign authority.  As such, it continues to 
have profound influence in the lives and bodies of people in ever increasing 
scope, and it succeeds in that influence because of what I have called the 
occultation of law under global governance.  While legal anthropology has 
been at times a great interlocutor in discussions of law and society, its recent 
inability to capture the interplay of formal law with everyday meanings and 
practices has led to its marginalization among legal academics—the 
epistemic community most charged with what Llewellyn called the 
“questing” aspect of the law jobs.194  With recourse to specific doctrines of 
tort law, this article has attempted to show ways in which formal law viewed 
emically already “black boxes” problems of cultural difference and meaning 
for practical reasons, so that continued assertion of this is of minimum 
consequence to law’s refinement.  In pointing this out, my hope has been to 
advocate reorientation in fieldwork on law, and to remind legal scholars of 
the great potential offered by well-grounded theories and methods in legal 
anthropology.            
 
                                                           
 193. See Bix, supra note 5, at 977.  This advocacy for a partial return to sites of sovereign power inflects 
Bix’s description of law’s relative autonomy.  Id. 
 194. Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 1375.  
 
